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Abstract: This paper contributes to the semantic typology of dependent 
indefinites, by accounting for the distribution and interpretation of the 
Romanian indefinite vreun. It is shown that its occurrences are restricted 
to negative polarity and a subset of modal contexts. More specifically, 
the study of its behavior in intensional environments reveals that vreun is 
systematically incompatible with non-epistemic operators, a restriction 
we capture by proposing a novel empirical generalization (‘the epistemic 
constraint’). To account for the observed pattern, we adopt the unitary 
approach to polarity in Chierchia (2006, 2013) and derive the properties 
of vreun from its obligatory association with alternatives. Its 
distributional restrictions are argued to follow from the interplay between 
the types of alternatives it activates (scalar and subdomain alternatives), 
the way these alternatives are factored into meaning (via an 
independently motivated mechanism of exhaustification) and the lexical 
semantics of the operators in the context of occurrence. We propose that 
the epistemic constraint arises from the lexicalization of an inference 
(anti-total variation) that non-epistemic operators can never satisfy.   
 
 
Keywords: polarity sensitivity, epistemic indefinites, free choice, alternatives, 
exhaustification 
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1. Introducing the Romanian determiner vreun 
1.1 Background 
This paper focuses on the Romanian determiner vreun, whose distribution was shown 
by Farkas (2002) to pose a challenge to current theories of semantically dependent 
indefinites. Morphologically, vreun (and its feminine form vreo) is a complex variant 
of the standard indefinite article un (masculine)/o (feminine), combined with the 
morpheme vre- (from the Latin verb volere ‘want’), which occurs with singular 
countable nouns. As illustrated by the ungrammaticality of the episodic sentence in 
(1), vreun has a restricted distribution, a property that sets it apart from the indefinite 
article form on which it builds:  
 
(1) * Monica  s-a                    întâlnit cu     vreun   prieten/        vreo     prietenă  
             Monica  REFL-have.3SG met      with  VREUN  friend.MASC VREUN  friend.FEM 
   ‘Monica met a friend.’ 
   
Exclusion from episodic sentences is typically assumed to be the hallmark of polarity 
sensitive, or more generally, dependent indefinites.1 A common strategy in the 
literature on polarity sensitive items consists in trying to identify licensing conditions, 
i.e. subsume their contexts of occurrence under some common description. Among 
other things, this strategy led to Ladusaw’s generalization on the distribution of 
negative polarity items (NPIs), restricted to downward-entailing contexts (1979); or to 
the long-standing observation that free choice items (FCIs) are sensitive to modality 
(e.g. Vendler 1967). Licensing conditions are inherently descriptive, but they set the 
stage for an explanatory account for the phenomenon of polarity.  
In line with this tradition, the first goal of the present study is to provide an 
accurate description of the contexts of occurrence of vreun. In doing so, we build on 
the account in Farkas (2002, 2006), which to my knowledge constitutes the only 
detailed study of vreun in the literature. We refine the empirical picture, by further 
probing two environments Farkas mentions, namely modal and attitude contexts. This 
brings out distributional contrasts previously overlooked, which I subsume under a 
novel empirical generalization (‘the epistemic constraint’). The outcome is that vreun 
occurs in the scope of downward-entailing and non-factive epistemic operators, a 
pattern that sets vreun apart from other dependent indefinites documented to date. 
This empirical investigation contributes to a more general research program that aims 
to identify and explain the possible parameters of variation among (dependent) 
indefinites (see Aloni 2007; Aloni and Port 2010; Aloni and van Rooij 2007; Alonso-
Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito 2008, 2010; Chierchia 2006, 2013a; Condoravdi 2005; 
                                                
1 I use the terms ‘polarity sensitive’ and ‘dependent indefinite’ interchangeably, to refer to indefinites 
that are excluded from episodic sentences like (1). 
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Dayal 1998, 2004; Farkas 2002, 2006; Giannakidou 1997, 2011; Haspelmath 1997; 
Jayez and Tovena 2006, 2007; Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Zamparelli 2007).  
 The second goal of this study is to provide an explanatory account of vreun, 
which derives its behavior from its meaning and the nature of semantic composition, 
without making reference to any licensing operators (be they downward-entailing or 
epistemic). To this end, adopting the framework in Chierchia (2006, 2013a,b), I 
develop an alternative-based account that captures its distribution, while providing 
ways to situate vreun in a broader typology of polarity sensitive indefinites. We 
analyze vreun as an indefinite with obligatorily active alternatives and show that its 
(un)grammaticality is the direct consequence of the interplay between its alternative-
triggering meaning and the semantic properties of the embedding operator. More 
specifically, we will demonstrate that the alternatives activated by vreun can only be 
successfully factored into meaning in the presence of a downward-entailing or modal 
operator. The restriction to epistemic contexts is derived by positing a further 
requirement on the set of alternatives activated by vreun, which we argue to conflict 
with the lexical meaning of non-epistemic operators.  
The discussion is organized as follows: in the rest of this section, we survey 
the distribution of vreun, drawing on the generalizations and account in Farkas (2002, 
2006). In section 2, we turn to a closer examination of the behavior of vreun in modal 
and attitude contexts, which we characterize by proposing a new empirical 
generalization (‘the epistemic constraint’). Section 3 introduces the main assumptions 
underlying the alternative-based approach to polarity adopted in this paper (due to 
Chierchia 2013a,b). Section 4 derives the distribution of vreun, focusing on its 
restriction to epistemic contexts, which is argued to follow from constraints on the 
alternatives it activates and the semantics of the modal operators vreun interacts with. 
Section 5 summarizes and discusses some open issues for future research. 
1.2 A previous account: Farkas (2002, 2006)  
We start our study of vreun2 by introducing the data and account in Farkas (2002, 
2006), which constitute the point of departure of the present study.  
The properties of the Romanian determiner vreun are first discussed in Farkas 
(2002), which carefully examines its distribution and points out the difficulty in 
formulating the underlying generalization(s). The first important descriptive 
observation is that vreun clearly does the work of a weak negative polarity item in 
Romanian, like English any or ever. The following examples3 show that the 
determiner vreun can be used in interrogatives (2), antecedents of conditionals (3) and 
restrictors of universal quantifiers (4), all very common NPI-licensing environments: 
 
                                                
2 I restrict the discussion to DPs introduced by vreun, but there is another morphologically related item 
vreodată (vre  + odată ‘once’) 'ever' to which the analysis developed here can be extended. There is 
also a partitive use of vreun, mentioned in Farkas (2002), which I briefly discuss in section 2.5. The 
judgments reported here have been tested with around 30 native speakers.  
3 All examples in section 1.2 are taken from Farkas (2002), with glosses slightly modified to match the 
rest of the examples in this paper. 
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(2)  Ai  văzut vreun  ţigan  fericit?    
have.2SG  seen  VREUN gypsy  happy  
‘Have you seen any happy gypsy?’ 
(3) Dacă găseşti  vreo  carte  despre asta, cumpără−mi−o.  
if  find.2SG VREUN book  about  this  buy-me.DAT-it  
‘If you find any book about this, buy it for me.’ 
(4) Fiecare fată care a     dansat  cu    vreun  student  va   fi  chemată la direcţiune.  
every   girl  who has danced with VREUN student  will be called     to office  
‘Every girl who danced with any student will be called to the principal’s 
office.’ 
 
In all these sentences, vreun has a meaning similar to polarity sensitive any. 
Furthermore, it can occur in the scope of negative operators: 
 
(5) a. A   plecat fără   să  vorbească cu  vreun   profesor.   
    has left     without  SUBJ  speak         with VREUN teacher  
    ‘(S)he left without speaking to any teacher.’ 
b. Nu  cunosc  vreun   medicament care să-l         ajute.  
    NEG know.1SG VREUN medicine    that SUBJ-him help  
‘I don’t know of any medicine that can help him.’ 
 
Furthermore, like NPIs, vreun needs to be in the immediate scope of its licensor, a 
restriction that is responsible for its ungrammaticality in (6): 
 
(6)  *Vreun student nu   a     picat.  
  VREUN student NEG has failed  
 ‘Any student didn’t fail./No student failed.’ 
 
These facts suggest that vreun is subject to the same distributional constraints as NPIs. 
However, Farkas points out two facts indicating that the behavior of vreun doesn’t 
entirely match that of NPIs: (i) restrictions on its use in negative sentences and (ii) 
occurrence in non-negative polarity contexts. First, unlike standard NPIs, vreun isn’t 
always licensed by clause-mate sentential negation. The negative concord item niciun 
is used in negative sentences, rather than vreun, as illustrated in (7):4 
 
(7) Nu  am            *vreo      prietenă/✓nicio  prietenă la  Utrecht.  
NEG have.1SG   VREUN    friend       no     friend     in Utrecht  
‘I don’t have any friend in Utrecht.’ 
 
                                                
4 We find a reverse pattern in the case of non-local negation, which typically doesn’t license negative 
concord items. As a result, vreun is acceptable in the scope of long-distance sentential negation. On the 
distribution of negative concord items in Romanian, see e.g. Fălăuş (2009) and Iordăchioaia (2009). 
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The determiner niciun constitutes the default option in the local scope of sentential 
negation, but it does not entirely preclude the use of vreun, as exemplified above in 
(5b). The conditions governing the choice between vreun and niciun are not clear, but 
in contexts where they are both possible, such as (5), vreun seems to make a less 
categorical statement. More precisely, “vreun is natural in the presence of a clause-
mate negation in examples […] where it is less likely that the truth of the statement 
can be checked by verifying all relevant values” (Farkas 2002:138), e.g. the entire set 
of possible medicines in (5b). Without getting into further details for the time being, 
let us conclude that the interaction of vreun with sentential negation is affected by the 
availability of negative concord items in Romanian. 
 A second set of facts not captured by characterizing vreun as an NPI is its 
occurrence in the non-negative polarity contexts in (8)-(9):  
 
(8) Din   când  în când  trenul       se     oprea             în   vreo     haltă     și   câte  
 from when in when train-the  REFL stop.IMPF.3SG in VREUN   station and DIST  
 un navetist     deschidea un ochi. 
 a   commuter opened      an eye  
‘From time to time, the train would stop in some station and a commuter 
would open an eye.’ 
(9) a. E          posibil    ca    Maria să      se      fi    întâlnit cu     vreun    prieten  
           be.3SG possible  that  Maria SUBJ  REFL  BE  met      with  VREUN  friend  
      şi     să      fi   rămas       cu     el    în oraş. 
              and  SUBJ  BE remained  with  him in town  
         ‘It is possible that Maria met some friend and stayed with him in town.’ 
 b. Poate     că    şi-a               cumpărat vreo     carte  despre Utrecht.  
    perhaps that her.DAT-has  bought     VREUN  book about   Utrecht.  
   ‘Perhaps she bought herself some book about Utrecht.’ 
 
In (8), vreun is licensed by the so-called frequentative imperfective, which refers to a 
series of train-stopping events. The use of vreun stresses the random pairing between 
train-stopping situations and stations. In (9), vreun occurs in the scope of an epistemic 
modal operator and conveys the speaker’s ignorance with respect to the referent of the 
vreun-DP. Crucially, none of these contexts license NPIs, as also attested by the fact 
that in English some or other would have to be used instead of any. From a cross-
linguistic perspective, the occurrence of an item with NPI-like properties in non-
negative polarity environments is expected, as it constitutes a very common behavior 
for NPIs across languages (see e.g. Haspelmath 1997). However, unlike NPIs that 
double as FCIs and thus occur in various modal(ized) contexts (e.g. any), vreun is 
excluded from generic sentences, imperatives or the scope of the verb want: 
 
(10) *Vreun lup    mănâncă carne.  
 VREUN  wolf  eats         meat  
‘A wolf eats meat.’ 
(11) *Ia    vreun    măr! 
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 take.IMPV.2SG VREUN   apple 
‘Take an apple!’ 
(12) *Vreau     să    cumpăr vreo      carte  despre  Olanda.  
want.1SG  SUBJ  buy     VREUN  book  about   Holland 
‘I want to buy a book about Holland.’ 
  
These facts illustrate the challenge raised by the distribution of vreun: it resembles 
other polarity items in requiring some kind of licensor, but the set of licensing 
operators doesn’t fall within the categories familiar from the study of other dependent 
indefinites. A proper account of vreun therefore needs to explain (i) why vreun has a 
limited distribution; (ii) why vreun is licensed in precisely the environments where we 
find it and only there; and (iii) the difference between vreun and other dependent 
indefinites in Romanian (e.g. FCIs orice or un oarecare, negative concord niciun).  
Farkas (2006) provides answers to these questions, shedding light on the data 
discussed so far and situating vreun with respect to other dependent indefinites in 
Romanian.5 More precisely, Farkas argues that vreun is an obligatorily existential 
element (i.e. the variable it introduces has to be bound or has to agree with an 
existential quantifier), which requires the existence of a set of alternatives that count 
as equal. This is common to all occurrences of vreun. Depending on the alternatives 
involved and the requirement imposed on these alternatives, the uses of vreun fall 
under two categories. On the one hand, like NPIs and FCIs, vreun may denote a 
maximal set of alternatives that verify the expression in which the item occurs. On 
this use, which characterizes its occurrences in negative polarity contexts (such as (2)-
(5)), vreun is called an undifferentiated choice item. More formally, its interpretation 
involves a maximal set of mutually exclusive verifying alternatives. Alternatives are 
defined as assignment function-situation pairs and differ in the value assigned to a 
particular variable. The alternatives associated with vreun are maximal in that they 
include all possible values of the relevant variable (within the limits of salient 
contextual restrictions). The mutual exclusivity requirement ensures that each 
alternative in the relevant set is different from all the others, with respect to the values 
assigned to both individual and situation variables. The fact that alternatives are 
undifferentiated means that the choice among them is free: whichever alternative is 
chosen, the expression where vreun occurs is verified. For example, in the if-
antecedent in (3), vreo carte denotes a maximal set of mutually exclusive alternatives 
involving different situations and different books in them, one such alternative for 
each possible book. The conditional then says that each larger possible situation in 
which the addressee finds a book is such that the addressee should buy that book. 
Which book is chosen for which situation is irrelevant; the only requirement imposed 
                                                
5 Farkas (2002) has mainly a descriptive goal, aiming to characterize the distribution of vreun and to 
identify its distinctive features with respect to other indefinites. Although this first paper on vreun 
contains some of the main ingredients of the analysis (e.g. the hypothesis that vreun is an obligatorily 
existential element, whose semantics makes reference to a set of alternatives), it is Farkas (2006) that 
provides a more detailed formal treatment of vreun. For reasons of space, I omit the presentation of the 
analysis in Farkas (2002) and focus on the more articulated version in Farkas (2006).  
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by vreun is that there be one verifying alternative for each situation that satisfies the 
antecedent.    
On the other hand, vreun can be used as a random choice item, in contexts 
such as (8) and (9) above, where undifferentiated choice items (e.g. NPIs and FCIs) 
are not possible (as the context could not satisfy the requirements imposed on the i 
alternatives). Random choice items also make reference to a set of alternatives that 
count as equal, but they differ from the alternatives involved in the interpretation of 
undifferentiated choice items in two respects. First, undifferentiated choice items 
require the set of alternatives to be maximal, i.e. to involve all possible values, 
whereas the individual variable of a random choice indefinite does not have to 
exhaust the domain of possibilities. Second, random choice items must allow for the 
possibility that there be no verifying value for the indefinite. In (8) for instance, there 
are situations where the train does not stop and consequently, there is no value for the 
vreun phrase. Similarly in (9), the use of the epistemic modal is compatible with 
situations where Maria met no friend or no book about Utrecht is bought.    
Taking stock, Farkas lays out the main properties of vreun and identifies the 
challenges they raise. On the account she proposes, there are two different uses of 
vreun, whose common thread is the reference to a set of alternatives. The context has 
to satisfy the requirements imposed by the use of an undifferentiated choice item 
(maximal mutually exclusive verifying alternatives) or those imposed by a random 
choice item (uncertain existence of verifying values). If neither can be done, as for 
example in episodic sentences, vreun is ruled out. For a formal implementation of the 
account sketched above and for details on how it rules out the use of vreun in 
environments such as those in (10)-(12) above, as well as the differences and 
similarities with other Romanian indefinites, the reader is referred to Farkas (2002, 
2006). For our present purposes, this informal presentation of the analysis suffices to 
establish the main characteristics of vreun and sets the basis for the account to be 
developed in this paper. As we will see, the intuition that vreun is an existential 
element, whose distribution is restricted to two different sets of environments, as well 
as the idea that its semantics makes reference to alternatives, will be preserved. But 
first, I would like to complete the empirical picture outlined so far by further 
examining the behavior of vreun in two sets of non-negative polarity contexts, namely 
modals and attitude verbs. This will enable us to refine the generalizations introduced 
above, leading to a better understanding of the issues raised by vreun.   
2.  The epistemic constraint  
This section shows that the distribution of vreun in modal and attitude contexts is 
subject to further restrictions, which I capture by proposing a novel empirical 
generalization, ‘the epistemic constraint’.  
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2.1  The basic distinction 
In the previous section, we have seen that in addition to its NPI use, vreun occurs in 
non-negative polarity environments, such as (9), repeated below: 
 
(9)  E         posibil    ca    Maria să      se      fi    întâlnit cu     vreun    prieten  
       be.3SG possible  that Maria SUBJ  REFL  BE  met      with  VREUN  friend  
  şi     să      fi   rămas       cu     el    în oraş. 
         and  SUBJ  BE remained  with  him in town  
      ‘It is possible that Maria met some friend and stayed with him in town.’ 
 
In (9), vreun takes scope under the modal operator ‘it’s possible’; the sentence 
conveys that Maria might have met a friend, the speaker doesn’t know which friend, 
and she might have stayed with him in town. In order to understand this use of vreun, 
it will be useful to consider indefinites that trigger a similar ignorance (or 
indifference) reading, such as the closely related Romanian indefinite un NP oarecare 
(Săvescu-Ciucivara 2007:211): 
 
(13) Maria poate  să   rezolve  o problemă  oarecare. 
 Maria can SUBJ  solve.3SG  a problem  OARECARE 
a. ‘There is a certain problem that Maria can solve, the speaker doesn’t   
know/care which problem it is.’ 
b. ‘No matter what problem Maria is faced with, she is able to solve it.’ 
 
Both vreun and un NP oarecare are existential elements, occurring in modal contexts, 
and signaling that the speaker is unable (or unwilling) to identify the individual that 
satisfies the modal claim. Indefinites that convey information about the speaker’s 
epistemic state are often referred to as epistemic or modal indefinites and have 
received a lot of attention in the last decade (e.g. Aloni and Port 2010; Alonso-Ovalle 
and Menéndez-Benito 2008, 2010; Chierchia 2006, 2013a; Farkas 2002, 2006; 
Giannakidou and Quer 2012; Jayez and Tovena 2006, 2007; Kratzer and Shimoyama 
2002, among others). One of the common properties of these indefinites is their 
incompatibility with a continuation that would identify a referent for the indefinite 
phrase, i.e. the sentences in (9) and (13) couldn’t be felicitously followed by 
something like namely Paul.6 I will employ the term epistemic indefinite to refer to 
the use of vreun in non-negative polarity contexts.  
 In the following, I argue that modals and attitude predicates provide crucial 
insights into the constraints governing the behavior of vreun as an epistemic 
indefinite. To show this, we examine previously overlooked contrasts in its 
distribution. More concretely, the contrast in (14)-(15) indicates restrictions on its 
occurrence in modal environments:  
                                                
6 The namely test was initially used for free relatives, which also have an ignorance or an indifference 
reading, see e.g., Dayal (1997), von Fintel (2000), Rawlins (2008). For a comparison between wh-ever 
relatives and free choice and epistemic indefinites, see Dayal (2009, 2013). 
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(14) Cu      numele     lui, trebuie  să       fie         vreun aristocrat.  
  with   name-the   his must     SUBJ   be.3SG   VREUN    aristocrat  
  ‘Given his name, he must be some aristocrat.’ 
(15) *Trebuie  să     mă    înscriu         la  vreun   curs  până  mâine.   
      must       SUBJ REFL  register.1SG at  VREUN class until  tomorrow 
     ‘I have to register for a class by tomorrow.’ 
 
Likewise, vreun is possible under some attitude verbs (hope), but not others (want): 
 
(16) ✓Sper   /*Vreau         să    găsesc  vreun    cadou pentru  sora         mea.  
  hope.1SG want.1SG   SUBJ find.1SG VREUN  present  for   sister-the  my  
         ‘I hope/want to find some present for my sister.’ 
 
The first goal is to identify the factor(s) responsible for the contrasts in (14)-(16), 
which are unexpected given the types of dependent indefinites attested in the 
literature. The examples above suggest that vreun occurs in a subset of intensional 
environments, so our first task in this connection is to find a uniform way to 
characterize the relevant environments. As discussed in section 1.2, vreun occurs in 
contexts that are ‘hypothetical’, where “the choice of vreun over the ordinary 
indefinite […] stresses the uncertainty of the existence of a verifying value in the 
world of evaluation” (Farkas 2006:90). Refining this observation, I argue that the 
distribution of vreun in non-negative polarity contexts is captured by the following 
generalization: 
 
(17) THE EPISTEMIC CONSTRAINT7 
The determiner vreun is licensed by obligatorily non-factive epistemic 
operators. 
 
By ‘obligatorily non-factive epistemic operators’, I refer to operators that quantify 
over epistemic alternatives and whose semantics makes them incompatible with 
situations where the proposition p embedded by the operator is established to be true. 
To put it differently, according to the epistemic constraint in (17), the epistemic 
alternatives must include both p-worlds and non p-worlds. This formulation seeks to 
capture the intuition that the uncertainty (concerning the truth of p) component is 
crucial for the acceptability of vreun. To make this concrete, let me demonstrate how 
                                                
7 In previous work, I offered a somewhat more abstract formulation of the epistemic constraint: 
(i) Context of occurrence: Op […vreun…] 
          Op p entails that the speaker’s epistemic alternatives include non p-worlds 
However, the formulation in (i) obscures the fact that the epistemic constraint is a descriptive 
statement, which puts together a number of contexts of occurrence, but which ultimately has no 
explanatory value on its own. The formulation in (17) retains the empirical coverage of (i), but has a 
more clearly descriptive status.  
Anamaria Fălăuş 
 
 10 
the epistemic constraint applies to vreun in the scope of modal operators (2.2 and 2.3) 
and attitude verbs (2.4).  
2.2 Presumptive mood  
The epistemic constraint is based on the intuition that vreun is restricted to 
environments that are hypothetical, where the speaker communicates she is not in a 
position to rule out completely the possibility that the proposition containing vreun is 
false. The context that shows in a straightforward way the role of this ‘uncertainty’ 
component is the presumptive mood - a ‘specialized’ mood for conveying hypotheses 
- which constitutes one of the prototypical contexts of occurrence for vreun. 
Morphologically, it presents different paradigms, following the pattern AUXILIARY 
MODAL  (conditional/future/subjunctive) + BE + PARTICIPLE (present/past). Irimia 
(2010) investigates the properties of the presumptive mood, and the way it differs 
from its homonymous future/conditional constructs, arguing that presumptive forms 
are subject to distinct syntactic, pragmatic, and semantic constraints. The point that 
bears directly on our discussion is that presumptive forms are semantically very 
similar to epistemic modals, insofar as they have a meaning component of indirect 
evidentiality. This means that upon using the presumptive, the speaker makes a claim 
that a certain state of affairs might hold (or might have held) and signals that her 
claim is based on an indirect source of information (e.g. inference or hearsay). This 
implies that the speaker is not in a position to exclude that things might be (or have 
been) different. The construct that is most relevant for our present purposes is the so-
called future2-based form, which always associates with inferences based on indirect 
evidence. The example in (18), taken from Irimia (2010), constitutes a typical context 
of use, where the fact that the lights are off is taken to be indirect evidence for the 
claim that someone might have gone to bed:  
 
(18)  Luminile   sunt stinse în apartamentul lor.    S-or           fi  culcat. 
lights-the  are    off     in apartment    their  SE-FUT2.3PL BE sleep.PAST.PRT 
≈ ‘The lights are off in their apartment. They might/must have gone to bed.’ 
 
The indirect evidentiality meaning associated with the presumptive form is not 
compatible with a proposition p that is taken to be true. In other words, the speaker’s 
epistemically accessible worlds have to include both p- and non p-worlds. As a result, 
the presumptive can never be used in propositions established to hold, such as the 
direct evidence context in (19) or the complement of a factive verb like know (20):  
 
(19) Watching by the window and seeing pouring rain: 
 #O              fi   plouând. 
   FUT2.3SG BE  rain.1SG.PRST.PART 
   ‘It must be raining.’ 
(20)  *Ştiu          că    oi              fi   având                    un  virus  în calculator 
  know.1SG    that FUT2.1SG  BE  have.1SG.PRST.PART  a    virus in  computer    
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  ‘I know I must have a virus in my computer.’ 
 
As predicted by the generalization in (17) above, which states that vreun is licensed 
by non-factive epistemic operators, the (inferential) presumptive plays a crucial role 
in the distribution of vreun: 
 
(21) Context: The house has been turned upside down and the money is missing. 
a. A              intrat      *vreun/ ✓un     hoţ. 
    have.3SG  entered     VREUN     a       burglar  
b. O              fi   intrat                   vreun    hoţ. 
    FUT2.3SG BE  enter.PAST.PART   VREUN   burglar  
    ‘A burglar might have got in.’ 
 
The intended interpretation of (21) is a hypothesis about the reason behind the mess in 
the house and the disappearance of the money, but despite this hypothetical meaning, 
clearly indicated by the context, vreun is ruled out in the episodic sentence in (21a). In 
contrast to this, the plain indefinite un hoţ ‘a burglar’ would be acceptable and would 
convey the intended ignorance effect concerning the identity of the burglar. If the 
indicative verbal form is replaced by the presumptive, vreun becomes acceptable 
(21b). This contrast is captured by the epistemic constraint in (17): in (21a), there is 
no operator that could license vreun, whereas in (21b), the use of the presumptive 
arguably supplies a non-factive epistemic licensor, which makes vreun acceptable.  
 These facts demonstrate the tight connection between vreun and the hypothetical 
meaning conveyed by the presumptive, a connection which makes the (inferential) 
presumptive an extremely frequent context of use for vreun.8 The contrast in (21) 
further shows that vreun is ruled out in episodic sentences (as already illustrated in (1) 
above) and that context is not sufficient to license vreun, even in cases where the 
intended hypothetical reading is easily available.  
2.3 Modal contexts 
The epistemic constraint in (17) also captures the distribution of vreun in a closely 
related set of environments, namely the scope of modals. Romanian has two modal 
auxiliaries, the possibility modal a putea and the necessity modal a trebui, which are 
used to express a wide range of modal meanings. The determiner vreun can occur 
under both these modals, but crucially, only when they are interpreted with respect to 
an epistemic modal base. For illustration, consider the following examples: 
  
(22) Se aud  des  sirene de ambulanţă,  trebuie/poate  să     fie  
 SE  hear.3PL often sirens  of ambulance  must     may  SUBJ be.3SG 
                                                
8 Vreun is also possible under the hearsay presumptive, especially in combination with the hearsay 
evidential cică, but this use is much less frequent and may be subject to dialectal variation: 
 (i)  Cică           ar              fi     apărut      vreun      nou   virus extrem       de     periculos. 
              EVID.ADV   COND.3SG BE     appeared  VREUN    new  virus extremely  of     dangerous 
           ‘(I hear/They say) A new, extremely dangerous virus has appeared.’ 
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 vreun  spital      prin zonă. 
  VREUN hospital  in    area 
 ‘One can often hear ambulance sirens, there must/may be a hospital nearby.’ 
(23) *Trebuie  să      trimit       vreun  articol până  mâine.         
              must SUBJ  write.1SG VREUN article  by  tomorrow   
 ‘I must send a paper by tomorrow.’ 
(24) *Ca  să   ajungi  în centru, poţi       lua   vreun     autobuz. 
              that  SUBJ get.2SG in center  can.2SG take   VREUN   bus 
  ‘In order to get downtown, you can take a bus.’ 
 
Sentence (22) has an epistemic construal, both with the necessity modal and the 
possibility modal, and vreun is perfectly acceptable. In contrast to this, when the 
modal has a deontic (23) or teleological (24) construal, vreun cannot be used, even if 
the speaker is fully ignorant with respect to the referent of the vreun-phrase. The 
obvious source for this contrast lies in the kind of alternatives that are relevant for the 
interpretation of the modal operator – epistemic in (22) and non-epistemic (sets of 
obligations or goals) in (23)-(24). Adopting the theory of modality due to Kratzer 
(1981, 1991), the interpretation of (22) amounts to (universal or existential) 
quantification over the worlds in the epistemic modal base, which picks out worlds 
compatible with the available evidence (e.g. the frequent sound of sirens, the fact that 
ambulances typically head to hospitals). In contrast to this, the modal statements in 
(23)-(24) are interpreted with respect to a circumstantial modal base, in which the 
relevant worlds are determined by certain obligations, goals or desires. These 
examples show that the epistemic modal base plays a decisive role in the acceptability 
of vreun, corroborating the epistemic constraint proposed in (17).  
 Having confirmed the role of epistemic alternatives, we can now examine 
more carefully the role of non-factivity, the other factor present in the epistemic 
constraint. Recall that this component of the generalization in (17) seeks to capture 
the ‘uncertainty’ flavor that characterizes the environments where epistemic vreun is 
acceptable, i.e. the incompatibility with operators that establish the proposition 
containing vreun to hold. Epistemic modals generally fall under this pattern. More 
specifically, in addition to quantification over epistemically accessible worlds, the 
meaning of an epistemic modal has often been argued to involve an indirect 
evidentiality component (see von Fintel and Gillies 2010 for a recent discussion of 
this matter). Simplifying, epistemic modals are sensitive to the type of evidence that is 
relevant for the truth of p: upon using an epistemic modal, the speaker is not only 
conveying something about her beliefs,9 but also that she only has indirect evidence 
for her claim. This leaves open the possibility that direct evidence eventually 
contradicts p. Arguments in favor of the presence of the evidential component come 
from situations where direct evidence conflicts with the use of an epistemic modal. 
                                                
9 According to the standard analysis of epistemic modals, we express possibilities on the basis of what 
is known (in the actual world). However, the behavior of embedded epistemic modals indicates that 
they are not necessarily knowledge-based, but rather they express compatibility with an epistemic 
agent’s beliefs, or his information state (e.g. Hacquard 2006). 
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The typical example involves perceptual evidence, e.g. upon looking at pouring rain, 
one cannot utter something like It must be raining. Direct evidence settles the truth of 
p, and conflicts with the indirectness signal carried by an epistemic modal. This in 
turn means that when the speaker chooses to make use of an epistemic modal, we are 
entitled to draw the inference that she is not in a position to make the non-modalized 
claim It is raining, i.e. she cannot rule out the possibility that the proposition does not 
hold. In other words, the speaker’s epistemic alternatives include (possibly unlikely) 
non p-worlds, a property that proves crucial for the distribution of vreun, both for its 
use with modal auxiliaries and the presumptive mood.10  
Interestingly, there are contexts where the uncertainty associated with indirect 
evidence does not seem to hold, as in (25), due to von Fintel and Gillies (2010): 
 
(25) Chris has lost her ball, but she knows with full certainty that it is either in Box 
A or B or C. She says: 
The ball is in A or in B or in C. It is not in A. It is not in B. So, it must be in C. 
 
Romanian epistemic modals are no different in this respect, i.e. they can be used in 
contexts like (25). However, whenever the uncertainty is explicitly ruled out, vreun is 
deviant. To see this, consider the following example: 
 
(26) We are playing cards. In order to win, I still need the ace of spades. However, 
by now all cards have been played and it is clear that the ace is not in the pile 
of cards on the table. So the only option is that one of the other players has it: 
 Asul     trebuie să    fie      la *vreun/✓un  jucător (şi  poate fi  oricare din ei).11 
ace-the must   SUBJ  be.3SG at VREUN   a     player and could be  any     of   them 
‘The ace must be with some/a player (and it could be any of them)’ 
 
The context makes it clear that one of the players has the ace, and although the 
speaker cannot identify the player in question, vreun cannot be used. Whenever the 
proposition embedded under the modal is established to hold, vreun is ruled out. 
However, most uses of epistemic modals differ from (25) and (26), insofar as the 
embedded proposition is typically not established to be true. As a result, non p-worlds 
are included among epistemic alternatives, i.e. the context is non-factive, a property 
that leads to the acceptability of vreun. 
                                                
10 Further evidence in favor of the non p-worlds component of epistemic modals comes from the 
following contrast (provided by an anonymous referee and attributed to Frank Veltman): 
(i) The door is ringing. It must be the pizza deliverer. No – it’s the mailman. 
     (ii) The door is ringing. It is the pizza deliverer. #No – it’s the mailman. 
11 As correctly noted by one of the referees, a possible issue arising in this context is the preference for 
a partitive indefinite (plain or epistemic). Since the set of possible values is very clear in the context, 
the default option used by speakers is a partitive indefinite like one of the players. The continuation in 
(26), and it could be any of the players is needed in order to make the use of a plain indefinite (a 
player) felicitous. However, despite the continuation, (non-partitive) vreun remains illicit in this 
context (for remarks on partitive vreun, see section 2.5). 
Anamaria Fălăuş 
 
 14 
 Summarizing, our discussion so far underlines the role of two factors in the 
distribution of vreun (i) epistemic alternatives and (ii) non-factivity (i.e. the existence 
of non p-worlds among the epistemic alternatives). I have argued that the epistemic 
constraint captures two tightly related contexts, both involving a component of 
indirect evidentiality - presumptive forms and epistemic modals. I now turn to attitude 
contexts, and show that they provide further support for the generalization in (17).  
2.4 Attitude contexts 
We have seen that the semantic properties of intensional operators embedding vreun 
provide the key to an adequate description of its restricted distribution. In addition to 
modals, one other context that is particularly relevant in this connection are attitude 
verbs.12 As expected in view of the previous discussion, we will be primarily 
concerned with the area of epistemic attitudes. Just like with modals, epistemic 
alternatives prove to be the crucial factor to which vreun is sensitive. This hypothesis 
is substantiated by the ungrammaticality of vreun under predicates whose 
interpretation does not involve epistemic alternatives, namely predicates referring to 
obligations, requests or suggestions, like the ones in (27):  
 
(27) *Roxana  m-a rugat/ mi-a  cerut/  mi-a  
 Roxana   me-have.3SG asked  me-have.3SG requested me-have.3SG  
 ordonat/  mi-a  sugerat  să  aduc  vreun   cadou.  
 ordered  me-have.3SG  suggested SUBJ  bring  VREUN  present 
‘Roxana asked/requested/ordered/suggested to me to bring some present.’  
 
Let us then focus on attitude predicates involving quantification over epistemic 
alternatives. On the generalization proposed here, we expect vreun to be ruled out 
under operators whose complement proposition is established to be true. The 
systematic ungrammaticality of vreun in factive contexts shows that this is borne out:  
 
(28)  *Ştiu  /*Am  aflat  că  am         vreun  virus în calculator.  
 know.1SG  have.1SG  found-out  that have.1SG  VREUN virus  in computer  
  ‘I know/found out that I have some virus in my computer.’ 
 
In contrast to this, vreun is perfectly acceptable under non-factive doxastic predicates:  
 
(29) Cred13/ Bănuiesc/  Sunt  convins/ Sunt  sigur  că   
         believe.1SG suppose.1SG am.1SG  convinced am.1SG  sure that  
am  vreun  virus  în  calculator. 
have.1SG  VREUN  virus  in  computer  
                                                
12 To the best of my knowledge, most of the facts introduced in this section constitute novel 
observations. Farkas (2002) notes the exclusion of vreun from the scope of want and emotive factives, 
but does not discuss further attitude contexts.   
13 The verb a crede lit. ‘to believe’ is ambiguous between English to believe and to think. The verb a se 
gândi lit. ‘to think’ is less frequent and conveys a more hypothetical meaning, similar to suppose.  
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   ‘I think/suppose/I’m convinced/sure I have some virus in my computer.’ 
 
How do these attitude predicates line up with the epistemic constraint? Recall the case 
of necessity epistemic modals: when we use Must p (on its epistemic construal), we 
assert that our epistemic alternatives are such that the proposition p holds, but we also 
typically convey that the claim is based on indirect evidence and hence we are not in a 
strong enough position to completely rule out non p-worlds. Likewise, when we assert 
something like ‘I think/suppose/assume p’, we not only communicate that it is 
compatible with our beliefs that a certain state of affairs holds (denoted by the 
complement proposition p), but also that we cannot fully exclude non p-situations. 
Crucially, if the complement proposition is established to be true, the speaker cannot 
use think or suppose (she would use know or believe). For example, in the pouring 
rain context, the speaker cannot felicitously utter I think/suppose it is raining. We find 
a similar incompatibility with situations where p is established to hold even for verbs 
like be convinced/sure, which once again, tend to be used in contexts where non p 
might hold. What is important to notice, in this connection, is the relevance of the 
uncertainty component for the occurrence of vreun. Just like with epistemic modals, if 
p is necessarily true, the embedding operators may sometimes be used, but vreun is 
ruled out. To see this, let us use the same context as in the case of epistemic modals:  
 
(30) We are playing cards. In order to win, I need the ace of spades. However by 
now, all cards have been played and it is clear that the ace is not in the pile of 
cards on the table. So the only remaining option is that one of the other players 
has it. I might not have thought this before, but now: 
 Cred           /Sunt      convins     că    asul     e  la   *vreun/✓un jucător. 
  believe.1SG    am.1SG  convinced that ace-the is at   VREUN    a   player 
 ‘I believe (=know)/I am convinced that some/a player has the ace.’ 
 
Verbs like think/believe or be convinced are generally not used in contexts where the 
embedded proposition is established to hold. If we enforce such a context, however, 
we see that vreun is ruled out, a fact that I take to support the generalization in (17).  
 The epistemic constraint defines the set of licensing operators of vreun as 
‘obligatorily non-factive epistemic’ operators. While the role of epistemic alternatives 
and non-factivity is clear in the distribution discussed so far, the ‘obligatorily non-
factive’ part hasn’t yet been justified. Its role is to capture the contrast already 
mentioned in (16) above, namely that between want, which precludes the use of vreun 
in its complement (31), and hope, which allows it (32):  
 
(31) *Vreau  să  găsesc vreun  cadou  pentru sora     mea.         
      want.1SG  SUBJ  find.1SG  VREUN  present for   sister-the  my 
           ‘I want to find some present for my sister.’ 
(32) Sper   să  găsesc vreun  cadou  pentru sora          mea.         
  hope.1SG  SUBJ  find.1SG VREUN  present for      sister-the  my  
         ‘I hope to find some present for my sister.’ 
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This contrast is surprising: both want and hope are non-factive predicates interpreted 
with respect to a set of doxastic alternatives and expressing that the worlds in which 
the embedded proposition holds are ranked high with respect to the attitude holder’s 
preferences (Heim 1992, von Fintel 1999). The two attitudes have a very similar 
semantics, but a non-uniform behavior with respect to the acceptability of vreun in 
their complement. The epistemic constraint, I argue, captures this contrast. To show 
this, I build on recent work on preference verbs, due to Scheffler (2008). More 
precisely, in discussing the semantics of preference verbs that allow V2 complements 
in Germanic, Scheffler identifies an epistemic component in the meaning of hope, 
which only makes it compatible with situations where the truth of the embedded 
proposition is not established, a property that want lacks. The contrast that is relevant 
for present purposes is given in (33):14 
 
(33) (To my students, in the middle of my class) I am teaching semantics…  
 a. ü…because I want to be teaching semantics/ü…and that is what I want. 
 b. # …because I hope to be teaching semantics/ # …and that is what I hope. 
 
Using once again a context that establishes a certain fact to hold, we notice that while 
want is perfectly compatible with this situation (33a), hope is not (33b). The fact that 
the truth-value of p is settled makes the use of hope infelicitous to refer to this fact, a 
restriction that does not apply to want. This shows that want does not entail that the 
epistemic agent countenances non p-worlds, whereas hope does. This is the 
conclusion reached in Scheffler (2008), who argues that hope implies that at the time 
of evaluation, the epistemic agent considers that both p and non p can hold. Of course, 
want can also be used in cases where both p and non p are considered possible, but the 
important point is that nothing in its meaning imposes the existence of non p-worlds 
among the doxastic alternatives, as made clear by its use in contexts like (33), where 
the complement proposition is established to hold. This, I argue, is the key difference 
between want and hope to which the distribution of vreun is sensitive. The epistemic 
constraint proposed in this paper captures this contrast, by making reference to 
‘obligatorily non-factive epistemic’ operators.  
2.5  Further empirical issues 
Let us now take stock and review the main results of the discussion so far. The 
primary goal of this section was descriptive, and consisted in the identification of 
‘licensing constraints’, i.e. the factors underlying the (non-)occurrence of the 
determiner vreun. I take the facts examined in this paper to indicate that the core 
distribution of vreun can be subsumed under two broad categories: (i) negative 
polarity environments and (ii) (a subset of) epistemic contexts.  
                                                
14 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the use of complements over which the subject 
has control and for helping me clarify this part of the discussion.  
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On the one hand, as already shown in Farkas (2002), in negative polarity 
contexts, vreun behaves like an NPI. More precisely, vreun occurs in a wide range of 
(arguably) downward-entailing contexts15 (see examples (2)-(5) in section 1.2). To 
this, we may add the fact that vreun is sensitive to intervention effects, a property of 
NPIs known since Linebarger (1980). In (34b) for example, conjunction has an 
intervening effect, rendering the sentence ungrammatical.   
 
(34) a. Mă           îndoiesc    că    Paul a     obţinut   vreun  rezultat interesant. 
        REFL.1SG   doubt.1SG that Paul has obtained VREUN result    interesting 
        ‘I doubt that Paul has obtained any interesting result.’ 
 b. *Mă        îndoiesc    că    a    obţinut   date noi   și  vreun  rezultat interesant. 
   REFL.1SG doubt.1SG that has obtained data new and VREUN result  interesting 
    ‘I doubt that he has obtained new data and any interesting result.’ 
 
The only unexpected aspect of the behavior of vreun in negative polarity contexts is 
its interaction with sentential negation. More precisely, recall that its distribution in 
negative sentences is affected by the availability of the negative concord item niciun, 
which constitutes the default option (see the examples in (7)). There are however 
contexts where vreun easily co-occurs with sentential negation, namely sentences 
with negative concord indefinites, such as (35): 
 
(35) Nimeni  nu   a    avut  vreo   informaţie despre crimă. 
  Nobody NEG  have.3SG  had  VREUN information  about  murder 
  ‘Nobody had any information on the murder.’ 
 
The reason for using vreun in (35), I assume, is that a sentence with two negative 
concord indefinites is ambiguous between a negative concord reading (with a single 
negation) and a double negation reading (where the two negations cancel each other 
out), as shown in Fălăuş (2009) and Iordăchioaia (2009). For example, if we replace 
vreo in (35) with nicio, the sentence becomes ambiguous between the negative 
concord reading we could paraphrase as ‘It is not the case that anybody had any 
information on the murder’ and a double negation reading equivalent to ‘Everybody 
had (at least) some information on the murder’. The analysis of negative concord is 
not directly relevant to our discussion, the only important matter being that in order to 
avoid the ambiguity caused by the co-occurrence of several negative concord 
indefinites, whenever possible, vreun indefinites are used instead, yielding only the 
reading associated with negative concord. This indicates that vreun can occur in the 
direct scope of clause-mate sentential negation and is thus no different from other 
NPIs in this respect. The fact that its distribution is more restricted, as compared to 
                                                
15 There are well-known issues arising with respect to the generalization that NPIs are licensed in 
downward-entailing contexts, which need not concern us here (see Zwarts 1998, von Fintel 1999, 
Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007, Gajewski 2011, Giannakidou 2011, Nicolae 2013). The only relevant 
observation at this point is the similarity between the distribution of vreun and that of other, more 
familiar, NPIs across languages. 
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NPIs like any or ever, is closely related to the existence of negative concord items, 
used as the default option in this context. The data considered here, then, supports the 
generalization that vreun displays an NPI-behavior. 
On the other hand, vreun occurs in the contexts subsumed by the epistemic 
constraint proposed in (17), which holds that vreun is licensed only by operators that 
are epistemic and whose semantics is incompatible with situations in which the 
complement proposition is established to be true. In this section, I have argued that 
this constraint provides a uniform characterization of the distribution of vreun in 
modal and attitude contexts, thus offering a better perspective on what an explanatory 
account of vreun needs to capture. 
 The epistemic constraint helps disentangle an otherwise puzzling data set, but 
does not cover all non-negative polarity uses of vreun. In particular, it does not apply 
to its occurrence in sentences involving frequentative imperfectives, noted by Farkas 
(2002), illustrated in (8), repeated below as (36):   
 
 (36) Din   când  în când  trenul       se     oprea             în   vreo     haltă     și   câte  
 from when in when train.DEF REFL stop.IMPF.3SG in VREUN   station and DIST  
 un navetist     deschidea un ochi. 
 a   commuter opened      an eye  
‘From time to time, the train would stop in some station and a commuter 
would open an eye.’ 
 
This environment doesn’t fall under the epistemic constraint in any obvious way (and 
is not a negative polarity context either), but a proper discussion of how the account 
proposed in this paper extends to frequentative imperfectives must be left for another 
occasion.  
 To complete the description of the empirical properties of vreun, let me also 
note that the epistemic constraint does not apply to partitive vreun, which, as already 
mentioned in Farkas (2002), has a less restricted distribution than non-partitive vreun. 
More precisely, insofar as I can tell, it occurs in all contexts where non-partitive vreun 
can occur, but it is also acceptable in epistemic contexts where p is established to 
hold, such as the modal statement in (37) (in the ‘factive’ context in (26) above): 
 
(37) Asul     trebuie să      fie        la vreunul      din  jucători. 
 ace-the must     SUBJ  be.3SG at VREUN.DEF of      players  
 ‘The ace must be with one of the players.’ 
 
Similar considerations apply to the scope of think or suppose, i.e. partitive vreun 
would be acceptable in (30) above.16 Furthermore, the following example shows that 
it can also be used in some deontic contexts: 
 
                                                
16 The speakers I have consulted reject partitive vreun in the scope of factive verbs like know or find 
out, but further investigation is needed before reaching firm conclusions on this matter. 
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(38) Pentru a  fi  eligibili, candidaţii         trebuie  să     îndeplinească vreuna  
for       to be eligible  candidates-the  must     SUBJ meet.3PL       VREUN.DEF  
din condiţiile          prevăzute de lege.  
of   conditions-the  specified   by law 
‘To be eligible, the candidates must meet one of the conditions specified by 
the law.’ 
 
The properties of partitive vreun and the connection with its non-partitive counterpart 
need to be carefully investigated, but the facts in (37)-(38) suffice to establish that its 
distribution is not subject to the epistemic constraint. In this paper, I set aside the 
properties of partitive vreun and focus on the non-partitive determiner.17  
  Before proposing an account for the facts described above, a cross-linguistic 
remark. Putting aside the use of vreun in negative polarity contexts, we have seen that 
it resembles epistemic indefinites in occurring in modal contexts and conveying some 
form of uncertainty with respect to the referent. However, the paradigm we uncovered 
represents a more restricted case of semantic dependency, which to my knowledge 
has not been previously documented. The present focus on accurately describing, and 
accounting for, the properties of vreun prohibits an in-depth discussion of the 
typology of epistemic indefinites. Let me simply note that the restriction to epistemic 
contexts, in the sense discussed here, does not seem to characterize other dependent 
indefinites described in the literature. The difference becomes obvious once we 
consider their distribution in modal contexts. For example, nonveridical items like 
Greek kanenas (Giannakidou 1997, 2011) or epistemic indefinites like Spanish algún 
(Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito 2008, 2010) share with vreun the property of 
occurring in both negative polarity and modal contexts. However, unlike vreun, they 
do not impose any restriction on the type of modal operator, as attested by their 
occurrence under deontic modals: 
 
(39) a.  Prepi  na  episkeftis  kanenan  jatro.           
 must.3SG  SUBJ  visit  KANENAS  doctor 
  ‘You should visit a doctor.’ 
 b. Maria tiene que      terminar  algún  artículo   para mañana. 
              Maria has   COMP   finish      ALGUN   article    for    tomorrow  
              ‘Maria has to finish some paper for tomorrow.’ 
 
Distribution-wise, the determiner that seems to come closest to vreun is French 
singular quelque, discussed in detail in work by Jayez and Tovena (2006, 2007).18 A 
                                                
17 The distribution of any and partitive any is also different. However, whereas partitive vreun seems to 
have a wider distribution than its non-partitive counterpart, in the case of any, the partitive version has 
a more restricted distribution than the non-partitive one (see e.g. Dayal 2004, 2013).   
18 Jayez and Tovena show that quelque occurs in epistemic contexts and marks inferential evidentiality. 
Although they share an intriguing connection with (indirect) evidentiality, the Romanian and the 
French determiner differ in at least three respects: (i) quelque does not need an overt licensor (if the 
context is clearly hypothetical, quelque can occur in episodic sentences); (ii) quelque does not have an 
NPI use; (iii) quelque can also be used with abstract, uncountable nouns, unlike vreun.  
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systematic comparison between vreun and other indefinites is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but these brief comparative remarks should nevertheless suffice to make the 
main point: vreun presents an interesting pattern of restricted distribution, which can 
provide new insights into the parameters of variation among dependent indefinites. 
The approach to polarity developed in the remainder of this paper has ways to capture 
the cross-linguistic similarities and differences among dependent indefinites (as 
discussed at length in Chierchia 2013a), but my main focus at this stage of research 
concerns the properties of vreun. Accordingly, other indefinites will be considered 
only when this contributes to a better understanding of the Romanian pattern. 
The facts considered in this section complete the picture in Farkas (2002, 
2006), by drawing attention to the epistemic versus non-epistemic distinction that 
governs the behavior of vreun in modal and attitude contexts. The epistemic 
constraint constitutes an arguably novel way to carve out the data on the distribution 
of vreun in non-negative polarity contexts. However, both the characterization of 
vreun and the analysis proposed in the following sections preserve the core intuitions 
in Farkas’ work. More specifically, although implemented in different frameworks, 
both accounts take the determiner vreun to be an existential element with two 
different uses and rest on the assumption that alternatives provide the key to 
understanding its limited distribution. The challenge is not only to account for the 
restriction to negative polarity and non-factive epistemic contexts, but also to explain 
the connection between these two uses, while capturing the differences and 
similarities with other dependent indefinites. The remainder of this paper provides an 
analysis for the NPI and epistemic uses of vreun that meets these objectives.  
3.  An alternatives-and-exhaustification approach to polarity 
In order to provide an account that satisfies the criteria listed above, I adopt the theory 
developed in Chierchia (2006, 2013a,b), which derives the properties of various types 
of polarity sensitive items by positing an obligatory association with alternatives. This 
section introduces the framework and demonstrates how it captures the restricted 
distribution of polarity items, as well as the fact that certain negative polarity elements 
can also occur in ‘positive’, i.e. non-downward-entailing contexts. I present the theory 
in order to make the paper self-sufficient, but readers familiar with it can safely skip 
this section and go directly to section 4, which deals with the distribution of vreun.   
3.1  Main assumptions  
Building on insights in Kadmon and Landman (1993), Krifka (1995), Lahiri (1998) 
and Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), Chierchia (2006, 2013a,b) develops an 
alternative-based account of polarity, embedded within a more general theory of 
meaning enrichment. On this approach, polarity sensitivity is one of the many 
phenomena whose semantics involves the consideration of alternative semantic 
values. The theory is couched in a bidimensional semantics (cf. Rooth 1985, 1992), 
where alternatives are introduced and computed separately from the regular semantic 
values. The starting point is the interpretation of sentences such as the following: 
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(40) a. A: Who came to the party?    B: Paul and Sue. 
 b. I went to the party, greeted everybody, hugged Paul and Sue and left. 
 c. A: Mary likes the kids.      B: Not really. She likes PAUL and SUE. 
 
All these utterances convey that Paul and Sue are the only individuals in the context 
for which a certain property holds, a meaning that goes beyond what is literally said. 
For example, we understand (40b) as communicating that the speaker hugged Paul 
and Sue and didn’t hug anyone else among the people present at the party. There are 
two components leading to this enriched, non-literal interpretation: (i) a set of 
alternatives (e.g. other contextually relevant individuals) and (ii) the exclusion of the 
(non-entailed) alternatives. This strengthened meaning, i.e. the one obtained via the 
consideration and exclusion of alternatives, is often triggered by focus, although 
sometimes context is sufficient to prompt this effect, as in (40b). One of the crucial 
assumptions in this connection concerns the way meaning enrichment is achieved. In 
line with van Rooij and Schulz (2006), Fox (2007), Chierchia, Fox and Spector (2012) 
among others, Chierchia (2013a) argues that enrichment results from applying an 
exhaustivity operator, such as the one in (41), which is essentially a covert counterpart 
of only: 
 
(41)  OALT (p) = p ∧ ∀q ∈ ALT[q → p ⊆ q], where p ⊆ q means p entails q 
 
According to the definition in (41), the exhaustivity operator responsible for 
strengthening applies to a proposition p and the set of p’s (propositional) alternatives 
(ALT), and conveys that p (and its entailments) is the only true member of the set of 
alternatives.19 This meaning enrichment mechanism is used not only in the contexts in 
(40), i.e. question-answer pairs or focus, but is also argued to be responsible for scalar 
implicatures. For example, the implicature arising in (42a), according to which not all 
students in the context like syntax, or in (42b), where the disjunction is construed as 
being exclusive (Maria has a degree in physics or chemistry, but not both): 
 
(42) a. Some students like syntax. 
  b. Maria has a degree in physics or chemistry. 
 
Scalar terms, such as some and or, lexically activate a set of alternatives, which are 
factored into meaning via the exhaustivity operator defined above. Applying O to 
(42a), with respect to the set of alternatives in (43a), we get the interpretation in (43b), 
which includes the assertion and the negation of the stronger alternative with all: 
 
(43) a.  ALT = {some students like syntax, all students like syntax} 
                                                
19 See Fox (2007) and Chapter 2 in Chierchia (2013a) for detailed discussion of the correct definition of 
the set of alternatives considered for exhaustification.  
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 b. OALT(Some students like syntax) = some students like syntax ∧  
      ¬ all students like syntax    
  
This briefly illustrates how exhaustification (via O) leads to strengthened 
interpretations. The details and the motivation for an exhaustification-based theory of 
scalar implicatures need not concern us here (see Chierchia’s work and references 
therein). For present purposes, the important point is the availability of a covert 
operator that is used whenever (lexical, focus or contextual) alternatives are factored 
into meaning. Crucially, for scalar terms, this process is optional; it only takes place if 
alternatives are relevant for conversational goals.   
Polarity items also activate alternatives, an assumption that goes back to 
Fauconnier (1975). As we will see in section 3.2 below, a phrase such as any student 
activates domain alternatives, i.e. subsets of (contextually relevant) students. For 
example, if we are talking about students in humanities, the alternatives could involve 
students in linguistics and students in history. On the theory adopted here, this is a 
lexical property of polarity items, which manifests itself regardless of whether 
alternatives are relevant or not in a given context. What makes a polarity item 
dependent, as opposed to, say, a simple indefinite, is the fact that the alternatives it 
brings in must be used (just like alternatives activated through focus). In other words, 
whereas disjunction or simple indefinites can lead to meaning enrichment, as 
illustrated in (42)-(43), this process becomes obligatory in the presence of a polarity 
sensitive indefinite. More concretely, the main hypothesis is that polarity items are 
indefinites (i.e. existentially quantified elements) that systematically activate sets of 
alternatives. Active alternatives need to be factored into meaning, i.e. they require the 
presence of an appropriate alternative-sensitive operator in the structure.20 If the 
insertion of an exhaustivity operator results in a syntactically well-formed structure 
and leads to a semantically coherent meaning, the polarity item is licensed. If this is 
not the case, the result is ungrammatical. This is a property shared by all types of 
polarity items. Variation in the polarity system is captured through a restricted 
number of parametrical choices, along two interconnected dimensions: (i) nature of 
alternatives and (ii) modes of exhaustification. Depending on the types of alternatives 
polarity items activate (e.g. domain, degree or scalar), and the selected exhaustivity 
operator,21 we can derive the properties of various subclasses of polarity items (e.g. 
weak, strong, emphatic NPIs, ‘universal’ and existential FCIs, epistemic indefinites). 
An important consequence of the fact that exhaustification is conceived as a 
grammatical mechanism is that it can apply recursively, i.e. to structures that have 
                                                
20 This requirement is implemented by using a syntactic feature-checking mechanism, which ensures 
that the exhaustivity operator enters into a syntactic relation akin to agreement with the polarity item. 
The syntactic details of the theory (concerning features and checking relations with the appropriate 
exhaustification operator) are entirely set aside in this paper. 
21  In addition to the operator in (41), exhaustification can also take place via a covert even, defined as 
follows (Chierchia 2013a, p.148): 
(i) EALT(p) = p ∧ ∀q ∈ ALT [p <µ q]    
   (p <µ q means p is less likely than q with respect to some contextually relevant probability measure µ) 
Even-exhaustification is selected by minimizers, such as give a damn or lift a finger. 
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already been exhaustified. This idea, which will be relevant for our analysis of vreun, 
has been used in Fox (2007) to derive free choice effects associated with disjunction 
in modal contexts. To illustrate Fox’s proposal, consider the utterance in (44a), which 
gives rise to the free choice inference in (44b), whereby both the cake and the ice 
cream are permissible options: 
 
(44) a. You are allowed to eat the cake or the ice cream. 
b. You are allowed to eat the cake and you are allowed to eat the ice cream. 
 
The set of alternatives to the disjunctive statement in (44a) includes the corresponding 
conjunction (the stronger scalar alternative), as well as each of the disjuncts (see 
Sauerland 2004, Alonso-Ovalle 2005, among others), as represented in (45): 
 
(45) ALT = {◊ (eat the cake ∨ eat the ice cream), ◊ (eat the cake ∧ eat the   
      ice cream), ◊ eat the cake, ◊ eat the ice cream} 
 
Exhaustification over this set amounts to exclusion of non-entailed alternatives (as 
defined in (41)), which in this case means we exclude all alternatives in ALT. This 
not only does not derive the desired free choice inference, but actually leads to a 
contradiction, as it says that it is possible to eat the cake or the ice cream and at the 
same time, it is not possible to eat either of them: 
 
(46) OALT (◊ (eat the cake ∨ eat the ice cream)) = ◊ (eat the cake ∨ eat the  
  ice cream) ∧ ¬ ◊ eat the cake ∧ ¬ ◊ eat the ice cream ∧ ¬ ◊ (eat the 
cake ∧ eat the ice cream) = ⊥ 
 
Fox’s solution consists in assuming that the set of alternatives against which the 
original assertion is considered includes the exhaustified versions of each of the 
disjuncts, given in (47): 
 
 (47)  a. O (◊ eat the cake) = ◊ eat the cake ∧ ¬ ◊ eat the ice cream 
    b. O (◊ eat the ice cream) = ◊ eat the ice cream ∧ ¬ ◊ eat the cake 
 
The exhaustified version of ‘you are allowed to eat the cake’ (◊ eat the cake), with 
respect to the assertion in (44a) can be construed as the answer to the question ‘Which 
of the two options - cake or ice cream - are you allowed to have?’. A possible answer 
is ‘you are allowed to eat the cake’, which is typically understood exhaustively – ‘you 
are only allowed to eat the cake’, i.e. ‘you are allowed to eat the cake and you are not 
allowed to eat the ice cream’. This interpretation is represented by assuming O applies 
to the disjunct ‘◊eat the cake’, as in (47a). Once we exhaustify the assertion with 
respect to the alternatives in (47), we get the computation in (48), which derives the 
free choice inference in (44b): 
 
(48) O (◊ (eat the cake ∨ eat the ice cream)) =  
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     ◊ (eat the cake ∨ eat the ice cream)          ASSERTION 
  ∧ ¬ ◊ (eat the cake ∧ eat the ice cream)      SCALAR ALTERNATIVE 
  ∧ ¬ O (◊ eat the cake)            EXHAUSTIFIED DISJUNCTS  
  ∧ ¬ O (◊ eat the ice cream)   
 = ◊ (eat the cake ∨ eat the ice cream) ∧ ¬◊ (eat the cake ∧ eat the ice cream)  
        ∧ ¬ (◊ eat the cake ∧ ¬ ◊ eat the ice cream)  
        ∧ ¬ (◊ eat the ice cream ∧ ¬ ◊ eat the cake) 
 = ◊ (eat the cake ∨ eat the ice cream) ∧ ¬◊ (eat the cake ∧ eat the ice cream) ∧ 
  (◊ eat the cake → ◊ eat the ice cream) ∧ (◊ eat the ice cream → ◊ eat the cake) 
 = ◊ eat the cake ∧ ◊ eat the ice cream ∧ ¬ ◊ (eat the cake ∧ eat the ice cream) 
 
Both the scalar and the pre-exhaustified alternatives are stronger than the assertion, so 
they must be eliminated. Exhaustification is consistent, i.e. does not give rise to a 
contradiction (unlike what we saw in (46)). The derived meaning is that it is possible 
to eat the cake or the ice cream and it is not possible to eat both. Moreover, if one of 
them is possible, the other one is possible as well. This delivers the desired free 
choice inference - you are not allowed to have both the cake and the ice cream, but 
each one of them is an allowable option.22  
 Chierchia (2013a) builds on this proposal to develop a unified theory of free 
choice effects. Exploiting the parallelisms between disjunction and polarity sensitive 
indefinites like any or irgendein, the free choice interpretation in modal contexts is 
argued to come about through the process of ‘recursive’ exhaustification illustrated 
above (see also Chierchia 2013b). Polarity sensitive items vary as to whether they 
tolerate pre-exhaustified alternatives. This is a matter of lexical choice, which 
determines their behavior. Polarity items that allow pre-exhaustified alternatives can 
occur in modal contexts (e.g. any or irgendein), for these are the contexts where their 
consideration leads to consistency and free choice effects. Polarity items that disallow 
pre-exhaustified alternatives (e.g. ever or lift a finger) do not give rise to free choice 
inferences and are excluded from modal contexts. 
In the following, I will briefly illustrate how the theory captures the 
distribution of polarity sensitive indefinites that occur in both negative polarity and 
modal contexts, using examples with the German item irgendein. The presentation 
stays close to the analysis in Chierchia (2013a), Chapter 5, but the discussion of the 
                                                
22 The scalar implicature can be removed, e.g. You are allowed to eat the cake or the ice cream, in fact, 
you are allowed to eat both. There are various ways to derive this. One possibility is to assume that the 
scalar alternative (SA) is not relevant, and therefore exhaustification is only achieved with respect to d-
alternatives (i.e. the disjuncts), as discussed in Chierchia (2013a, pp. 141-143). Another possibility is to 
assume that the scalar inference is computed prior to the modal and separately from d-alternatives (DA):  
  (i) ODA (◊ OSA (cake ∨ ice cream))  
Once (recursive) exhaustification over d-alternatives takes place, we obtain a formula that is 
compatible with eating both the cake and the ice cream: 
 (ii) ◊ ((cake ∨ ice cream) ∧ ¬ (cake ∧ ice cream)) ∧ ◊ the cake ∧ ◊ ice cream.  
Finally, yet another possibility, which would not require separating off exhaustification of scalar and d-
alternatives, is to follow Fox (2007). His method of avoiding exceedingly strong scalar implicatures 
relies on the assumption that we start out with pre-exhaustified alternatives. 
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formal details will be restricted to the elements that are necessary for an explanatory 
account of vreun, and as such, will remain incomplete. The reader is referred to 
Chierchia’s work for a more detailed presentation of the framework, justification of 
its core assumptions and comparison with other approaches to polarity.  
3.2  Polarity sensitive indefinites in negative polarity and modal contexts 
Like many other polarity sensitive indefinites, including vreun, the German indefinite 
determiner irgendein can occur in both negative polarity and modal contexts (see 
Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, Kratzer 2005): 
 
(49) a. Niemand hat  irgendein Buch  mitgebracht.  
    no one    had IRGENDEIN book brought along  
   ‘No one has brought along any book.’ 
 b. Du  darfst mit  irgendeinem Professor  sprechen.  
    you can    with IRGENDEIN    professor   speak  
    ‘You can speak with any professor.’ 
 
When occurring in the scope of a modal, irgendein triggers a free choice inference: 
the sentence in (49b) conveys that the addressee can speak to a professor and any 
professor (in the relevant domain) is a permissible option. No such free choice 
inference is present in negative polarity contexts such as (49a),23 where irgendein 
acquires an NPI reading, similar to English any. Both interpretations are derived by 
assuming irgendein is an existential element that obligatorily activates alternatives. 
The lexical entry of irgendein is given in (50a) and the sets of alternatives in (50b-c): 
 
(50) a. ⟦irgendein⟧  = λPλQ ∃x ∈ D [one(x) ∧ P(x) ∧ Q(x)]  
b. Scalar Alternatives 
     SA = {λPλQ ∃x ∈ D [n(x) ∧ P(x) ∧ Q(x)] | n ∈ N} 
 c. Domain Alternatives 
     DA = {λPλQ ∃x ∈ D’ [one(x) ∧ P(x) ∧ Q(x)] | D’ ⊆ D} 
 
According to (50), irgendein is an existential that activates two types of alternatives: 
(i) scalar and (ii) domain alternatives. The scalar alternatives activated by irgendein 
are numerical, two, three etc., on a par with the alternatives that can be activated by 
the simple indefinite a or the numeral one. The domain alternatives consist of all the 
subsets of D, where D is the contextually relevant domain of quantification.  
 With these assumptions in place, let us begin by deriving the interpretation of 
irgendein in modal contexts such as (49b). The assertion can be represented as in 
(51a), and the sets of domain and scalar alternatives as in (51b-c): 
 
                                                
23 Unless irgendein carries contrastive stress or combines with the particle einfach (nur) ‘just’. See 
Kratzer (2005) for details.  
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(51)  a. Assertion:  ◊ ∃x ∈ D [one(x) ∧ professor(x) ∧ speak-to(you,x)]24  
b. Domain alternatives: 
DA = {◊ ∃x ∈ D’ [one(x) ∧ professor(x) ∧ speak-to(you, x)]: D’ ⊆ D} 
c. Scalar alternatives:  
SA = {◊ ∃x ∈ D [n(x) ∧ professor(x) ∧ speak-to(you, x)]: one < n} 
 
These alternatives need to be exhaustified, a requirement implemented by assuming 
they trigger the insertion of an alternative-sensitive operator in the structure, such as 
the operator O in (41) above. Keeping the two types of alternatives separate, we use 
ODA and OSA to indicate exhaustification over domain and scalar alternatives 
respectively (52a).25 Assuming for simplicity a domain with three professors, (51) can 
be equivalently represented as in (52), where ‘a’ abbreviates ‘[professor(a) ∧ speak-
to(you,a)]’, ‘b’ abbreviates ‘[professor(b) ∧ speak-to(you,b)]’ and ‘c’ abbreviates 
‘[professor (c) ∧ speak-to(you,c)]’. The set of alternatives includes the assertion, 
scalar alternatives and domain alternatives, as schematized in (52b): 
 
(52) a. ODA OSA ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c)      
 b.     ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c)     ASSERTION  
    ◊ (a ∧ b)             ◊ (b ∧ c)     ◊ (a ∧ c) SA26 
        ◊ (a ∨ b)   ◊ (b ∨ c)   ◊ (a ∨ c)   DA 
             ◊a                         ◊b                       ◊c 
 
Exhaustification over this set of alternatives results in a contradictory statement, as 
already shown in discussing the behavior of disjunction in modal contexts (cf. (44)). 
The meaning we get in (53) is that it is possible to talk to one of the three professors 
in D, but at the same time it is not possible to talk to any one (or any two) of them: 
 
(53) ODA OSA ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c) = ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a ∧ b) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a ∧ c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (b∧c) ∧ 
     ¬ ◊ (a ∨ b) ∧ ¬ ◊ (b ∨ c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a ∨ c)      
 ¬ ◊ a ∧ ¬ ◊ b ∧ ¬ ◊ c = ⊥ 
 
Drawing on the similarity with disjunction, we know that this clash can be avoided if 
we use pre-exhaustified domain alternatives, given in (54). Recall that the 
                                                
24 I restrict the discussion to possibility modals, but the analysis generalizes to necessity modals. Note 
that epistemic indefinites, which always take scope below the modal, are ‘licensed’ by both necessity 
and possibility modals. In contrast to this, polarity sensitive items that scope above modal operators 
(such as ‘universal’ FCIs) are not acceptable under necessity modals (for extensive discussion, see 
Chierchia 2006, 2013a and Dayal 1998, 2013). 
25 See Chierchia (2013a, pp. 176-190, 277-280) on the differences between exhaustification applying 
sequentially or to the entire set of alternatives at once and the consequences for the distribution of 
polarity indefinites.  
26 In the following, I omit the scalar alternative that includes all members of D, ◊(a∧b∧c). The result is 
not affected by this simplification.  
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exhaustified version of ◊a with respect to the original assertion is equivalent to ‘only a 
can hold (and not b or c)’, and similarly for all the other alternatives:  
 
(54) a. O ◊ (a ∨ b)         O ◊ (b ∨ c)        Ο ◊ (a ∨ c) EXH-DA 
O ◊ a          O ◊ b         O ◊ c         
b.      ◊ (a ∨ b) ∧ ¬◊c     ◊ (b ∨ c) ∧ ¬◊a   ◊ (a ∨ c) ∧ ¬◊b EXH-DA 
         ◊a ∧ ¬◊b ∧ ¬◊c     ◊b ∧ ¬◊a ∧ ¬◊c       ◊c ∧ ¬◊a ∧ ¬◊b      
 
All exhaustified alternatives are stronger than the assertion, so through 
exhaustification, they will be excluded, as represented in (55a), which is logically 
equivalent to (55b). This winds up having the enriched meaning in (55c): the assertion 
and the scalar inference require that only one of the alternatives holds; the 
computation of exhaustified alternatives amounts to the requirement that if one 
alternative is possible, so are the others. This can only be satisfied if each one of the 
three alternatives is possible: 
 
  (55) a. ODA OSA ◊(a ∨ b ∨ c)  = ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧b) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (b∧c) ∧ 
    i.  ¬ (◊ (a ∨ b) ∧ ¬ ◊ c)  ∧          iv. ¬ (◊ a ∧ ¬ ◊ b ∧ ¬ ◊ c) ∧ 
           ii. ¬ (◊ (b ∨ c) ∧ ¬ ◊ a)  ∧          v. ¬ (◊ b ∧ ¬ ◊ a ∧ ¬ ◊ c) ∧ 
   iii. ¬ (◊ (a ∨ c) ∧ ¬ ◊ b) ∧         vi. ¬ (◊ c ∧ ¬ ◊ a ∧ ¬ ◊ b)  
b. ODA OSA ◊(a ∨ b ∨ c)  = ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧b) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (b∧c) ∧ 
     i. ◊ (a ∨ b) → ◊ c    ∧          iv. ◊ a → (◊ b ∨ ◊ c) ∧ 
           ii. ◊ (b ∨ c) → ◊ a    ∧           v. ◊ b → (◊ a ∨ ◊ c) ∧ 
  iii. ◊ (a ∨ c) → ◊ b    ∧          vi. ◊ c → (◊ a ∨ ◊ b)  
 c. ODA OSA ◊(a ∨ b ∨ c)  = ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧      (Assertion) 
¬ ◊ (a ∧ b) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a ∧ c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (b ∧ c) ∧ (Scalar inference) 
  ◊ a ∧ ◊ b ∧ ◊ c     (Free Choice inference) 
 
This illustrates how exhaustification yields the enriched meaning of (49b), namely 
‘you can speak to a professor chosen from the relevant domain of quantification, and 
each one of them is a possible choice’.27 The scalar inference is responsible for the 
fact that irgendein always has an existential reading; the free choice inference requires 
variation among the members of the relevant domain of quantification. The derivation 
of the two inferences is parallel to what happens with disjunction in modal contexts 
(see (44)). In both cases, the crucial assumption is the existence of active scalar and 
subdomain alternatives, which can be ‘recursively’ exhaustified. The main difference 
between or (or a simple indefinite such as a professor) and irgendein (and more 
generally polarity sensitive indefinites) is that alternatives associated with the former 
are only optionally active, whereas those associated with the latter are obligatorily 
active. This explains why the inferences triggered by irgendein are not optional. 
                                                
27 The strong ‘uniqueness’ implicature (‘you can speak to a single professor’) can sometimes be 
cancelled, just like in the case of free choice readings of disjunction (see fn. 22 for various ways to 
derive this effect). For simplicity, in the rest of the discussion I set aside this weaker scalar implicature.  
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 Having seen how to derive the inferences observed in modal contexts, let us 
now turn to negative contexts, such as (49a), where irgendein has a narrow scope 
existential reading, just like NPIs. To see how this interpretation comes about, assume 
that the domain relevant for the interpretation of irgendein in (49a) contains three 
books {a,b,c}. Using the same representations as before, the assertion to which 
exhaustification applies looks as in (56a) and the alternatives as in (56b-e): 
 
(56) a. ODA OSA (¬∃x ∈ D ∃y ∈ D’ [person(x) ∧ one(y) ∧ book(y) ∧ bring(x,y)]) =      
 b. ¬ (a ∨ b ∨ c)       ASSERTION    
c.   ¬ (a ∧ b)       ¬ (b ∧ c)      ¬ (a ∧ c)      SA 
d.  ¬ (a ∨ b)   ¬ (b ∨ c)   ¬ (a ∨ c)   DA 
        ¬a                   ¬b                    ¬c 
e. ¬ (a ∨ b) ∧ c  ¬ (b ∨ c) ∧ a   ¬ (a ∨ c) ∧ b         EXH-DA
     ¬a ∧ (b ∨ c)   ¬b ∧ (a ∨ c)   ¬c ∧ (a ∨ b) 
 
As before, the exhaustification triggered by the insertion of O seeks to eliminate all 
stronger alternatives. However, there are no stronger alternatives in this case. Both the 
scalar alternatives and the plain domain alternatives in (56c-d) are entailed by the 
assertion, so they cannot be eliminated. Assertion also entails the negation of the 
exhaustified domain alternatives in (56e).28 The result of exhaustification is therefore 
identical to the assertion in (56a). In other words, no scalar or free choice inference 
arises and irgendein is interpreted as an existential, i.e. it acquires an NPI-reading. 
The same conclusion arguably holds for all downward-entailing contexts, where the 
assertion is always the strongest alternative. On this theory, the NPI-behavior of items 
like irgendein is a logical consequence of the entailment relations holding in 
downward-entailing environments. 
 The hypothesis that polarity sensitive indefinites are existentials with 
obligatorily active alternatives predicts that these indefinites should be deviant in 
episodic contexts. As illustrated above, the presence of a downward-entailing or 
modal operator (together with the availability of pre-exhaustified alternatives) plays a 
crucial part in making the exhaustification process consistent. In (57), we use a toy 
example to show that in the absence of any of these operators, exhaustification leads 
to a contradiction (57b), as it simultaneously requires that one of the alternatives holds 
(a ∨ b ∨ c) and that none of them does:  
 
(57) a. a ∨ b ∨ c    ASSERTION  
a ∧ b      b ∧ c   a ∧ c      SA 
      a ∨ b      b ∨ c   a ∨ c   DA 
        a            b                c     
b. ODA OSA (a ∨ b ∨ c) = (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ ¬ (a ∧ b) ∧ ¬ (a ∧ c) ∧ ¬ (b ∧ c) ∧  
¬ (a ∨ b) ∧ ¬ (b ∨ c) ∧ ¬ (a ∨ c) ∧ ¬ a ∧ ¬ b ∧ ¬ c = ⊥ 
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This straightforwardly explains why items like any, ever or vreun are ruled out in 
episodic contexts (such as (1) above). Their alternatives cannot be properly 
exhaustified. The problem comes from the fact that there are stronger alternatives 
(every alternative in DA and SA is stronger than the assertion), but we cannot eliminate 
them in a contradiction-free manner, a situation that results in deviance.29 This derives 
the ungrammaticality of alternative-activating indefinites in episodic sentences.30 
 For certain elements in the polarity system, such as irgendein, a last resort 
strategy can rescue their use in sentences such as (58): 
 
(58) Irgendein  Student hat angerufen.  
         IRGENDEIN student  has called  
‘Some student or other called.’ 
    
Despite the fact that (58) makes reference to a single event, i.e. it is an episodic 
statement, irgendein can be used. The sentence triggers a modal inference, which we 
can paraphrase as ‘Some student called; for all the speaker knows, it might be any 
student (the speaker is ignorant as to the identity of the caller)’. Following Kratzer 
and Shimoyama (2002), this ignorance reading, which characterizes so-called 
epistemic indefinites (see the discussion in section 2.1), is assumed to arise through a 
covert assertoric modal. The LF of (58) is thus as given in (59) below, where ¨S 
means something like ‘the speaker knows that’: 
 
(59) ODA OSA ¨S [irgendein student hat angerufen] 
 
The presence of the epistemic modal in (59) renders exhaustification consistent and 
derives the ignorance inference mentioned above. If the modal were bouletic/goal-
oriented, the indefinite would convey indifference (i.e. the speaker/the relevant agent 
does not care about the referent of the indefinite). As Chierchia shows, if neither an 
ignorance nor an indifference reading is possible in a given context, irgendein cannot 
be used (Chierchia 2013a, p. 257): 
 
(60)  John hat geschummelt. *Deshalb ist irgendein Student aus deiner Klasse ein 
Betrueger. 
‘John cheated. Therefore some student in your class is a cheater.’ 
  
Languages and indefinites vary with respect to whether and when they allow this 
strategy. Future empirical work needs to determine the restrictions on the distribution 
                                                                                                                                       
28 Excluding an exhaustified alternative, such as ¬O¬(a ∨ b) = ¬(¬(a ∨ b) ∧ c) amounts to c→(a ∨ b), 
and similarly for all other alternatives.  
29 Note that recursive exhaustification, the consideration of pre-exhaustified domain alternatives also 
yields a contradiction in these sentences (see Chierchia 2013a, p. 255 for details).  
30 For details on when and why contradictions give rise to ungrammaticality, the reader is referred to 
Gajewski (2002) and Chierchia (2013a, pp. 42-54).  
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and nature of null modals, and explain their interaction with various kinds of 
indefinites. We limit ourselves to pointing out the explanation offered by Chierchia 
(and other alternative-based approaches) for the acceptability of certain dependent 
indefinites in seemingly episodic sentences such as (58). If we grant the existence of 
covert modality as a possible rescue mechanism, the theory offers a principled 
explanation for three distributional properties shared by a wide range of polarity 
sensitive indefinites: (i) exclusion from episodic contexts, (ii) occurrence in 
downward-entailing contexts and (iii) the need for a modal operator in non-
downward-entailing contexts.  
 Crucially, there is no ‘licensing’ involved: the way alternatives are computed 
in positive (i.e. upward-entailing), modal and downward-entailing contexts is 
independent of polarity items, as can be easily checked by looking at the behavior of 
disjunction or numerals (whose implicatures also typically disappear in downward-
entailing contexts). As previously mentioned, the key difference between dependent 
indefinites like irgendein or any and scalar terms like or lies in the fact that the 
former, but not the latter, obligatorily activate alternatives. This is the property that is 
ultimately responsible for the narrower distribution of polarity sensitive elements.  
4. An alternative-based account for vreun  
This section proposes an alternative-and-exhaustification account for vreun, adopting 
the theory introduced in the previous section. We start with the distributional 
properties that follow without any further assumptions (section 4.1) and then focus on 
the epistemic constraint documented in section 2 above.  
4.1  Situating vreun in the polarity system 
The alternatives-and-exhaustification theory outlined above straightforwardly derives 
the properties that vreun shares with irgendein and many other polarity sensitive 
indefinites, namely the restriction to downward-entailing and modal contexts. The key 
assumption is the obligatory association with two kinds of alternatives: (i) scalar and 
(ii) subdomain alternatives, both of which need to be exhaustified (via recursive 
applications of O). The presence of the DE or modal operator makes exhaustification 
consistent, explaining why vreun requires them. The derivation of the sentences in 
(61) is thus parallel to that discussed for (49), and as such, will not be repeated here: 
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(61) a. Lisa  nu    a      citit   vreo     carte.31 
    Lisa  NEG has   read  VREUN  book 
     ‘Lisa didn’t read any book.’ 
 b.  Se    poate ca  Maria să      se  fi  întâlnit cu  vreun  prieten. 
      REFL may  that  Maria SUBJ REFL be  met      with  VREUN  friend     
     ‘Maria might have met some friend.’ 
    
There is however an important aspect in which vreun differs from irgendein, namely 
its behavior in episodic contexts. Recall that vreun is systematically ruled out from 
episodic sentences (as illustrated in (1)). This happens even in environments where 
the ignorance reading is very salient, making it plausible to assume the presence of a 
null modal (see (21)). On the basis of this, we must conclude that covert modality 
cannot rescue vreun. As mentioned above, the availability of this strategy varies 
across items and across languages. In this respect, vreun might be like any-numeral 
construction, e.g. any two books, which is also ruled out in episodic contexts (see e.g. 
Dayal 2013 and Chierchia 2013a). While the absence of the ‘null modal’ option for 
vreun needs to be understood, the crucial point is that once this rescue strategy is 
construed as optional, the behavior of vreun in episodic statements is expected on the 
alternative-based approach sketched in section 3. Since exhaustification leads to 
deviance in the absence of a downward-entailing or modal operator (see (57) above), 
vreun is predicted to be ruled out in episodic environments.  
 However, recall from section 2 that vreun is subject to a further distributional 
restriction, namely the epistemic constraint in (17). Nothing in the analysis given so 
far accounts for the different behavior in the scope of epistemic and non-epistemic 
operators. In the remainder of this paper, I propose a way to extend the alternative-
based analysis and derive the epistemic constraint. To this end, we need to import one 
more piece of the formal apparatus of Chierchia’s theory, namely the difference 
between what are known as partial and total variation indefinites (section 4.2). This 
will lead to a better understanding of the interpretation of vreun in modal contexts and 
the differences with other indefinites. In section 4.3, I argue that the epistemic 
constraint follows from a further condition on the set of alternatives activated by 
vreun, a condition that taps into the distinction between partial and total variation. 
                                                
31 I take the restrictions on the use of vreun in negative sentences discussed in section 1.2 and 2.5 to be 
the result of a blocking effect induced by negative concord items. I am not aware of any explanatory 
theory of blocking, which could predict when it is active and when it isn’t, but it is clear that we are 
dealing with a widespread phenomenon (cf. Hoeksema 1999, Horn 2001, Perelstvaig 2004, among 
others). In the framework adopted here, the blocking effect of negative concord can be viewed as an 
instance of competition between strong NPIs (negative concord items) and weak NPIs (e.g. vreun), 
with a preference for the strong version under negation. The viability of this route depends on how 
exactly it gets implemented (see Chapter 4 in Chierchia 2013a for an alternative-based treatment of 
negative concord). But the frequency of such blocking effects lends support to a unitary approach to 
NPIs and negative concord items, which views them as parts of the same system, with the same 
possible sources of variation (restrictions on alternatives and exhaustification). 
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4.2  ‘Total’ versus ‘partial’ variation 
The first aspect of the interaction between vreun and modal operators that needs to be 
understood is the modal inference it gives rise to. More precisely, we know that vreun 
signals speaker’s ignorance with respect to the identity of the individual denoted by 
the indefinite. This makes it incompatible with continuations that specify the referent 
of the vreun-phrase, a property shared by a large number of epistemic indefinites, 
including German irgendein (e.g. Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, Aloni and Port 
2010), Italian un qualche and un NP qualunque (e.g. Chierchia 2006), French quelque 
and un NP quelconque (e.g. Jayez and Tovena 2007), Spanish algún (e.g. Alonso-
Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito 2008, 2010) or Romanian un NP oarecare (e.g. 
Săvescu-Ciucivara 2007). One crucial dimension along which epistemic indefinites 
vary concerns the extent of variation (‘freedom of choice’) imposed on the domain of 
quantification, which can be total or partial.32 On the one hand, it has been argued 
that certain epistemic indefinites (e.g. irgendein, un NP qualunque, un NP oarecare) 
can sustain TOTAL variation, requiring that all relevant alternatives in the domain of 
quantification qualify as equally possible options (as in (49b) above). For example, 
the sentence in (62), with the Romanian epistemic indefinite un NP oarecare, states 
that Maria has the obligation to work with a colleague and it could be any colleague: 
 
(62)  Maria  trebuie să      lucreze cu    un   coleg         oarecare.  
   Maria  must     SUBJ  work    with a     colleague  OARECARE  
‘Maria must work with a colleague, any colleague.’ 
 
In contrast to this total freedom of choice, we find epistemic indefinites that trigger a 
weaker inference - PARTIAL variation - some, but not necessarily all alternatives in the 
relevant domain are epistemic possibilities. As such, they are compatible with the 
exclusion of some of the possible options. The difference can be most readily 
observed in the scenario in (63), due to Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2010): 
   
(63)  Maria, Juan, and Pedro are playing hide-and-seek in their country house. Juan 
is hiding. Pedro believes that Juan is inside the house, but not in the bathroom 
or in the kitchen. 
a. Juan tiene que estar en alguna habitación de la casa. 
b. Juan trebuie să fie în vreo cameră din casă.            
    ‘Juan must be in a room of the house.’ 
 
The context makes it clear that not all rooms of the house are possible choices, i.e. the 
variation associated with the indefinite is limited to a subset of elements in the 
                                                
32 There is some variation in the literature concerning the terminology used, although insofar as I can 
tell, all the studies mentioned above refer to the same phenomenon. In this paper, ‘Partial Variation’ 
corresponds to ‘Modal Variation’, while ‘Total Variation’ to ‘Free Choice’ (or ‘Domain Widening’), in 
work by Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito, and Aloni and Port. For a related proposal, see Jayez 
and Tovena (2007). 
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relevant domain. While the use of algún or vreun is perfectly acceptable in this 
scenario, a total variation item like un NP oarecare or qualunque would be deviant. 
In order to derive the different modal inferences, the alternative-based 
framework adopted here capitalizes on the proposal in Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-
Benito (2008, 2010), which attributes the total/partial variation distinction to different 
sets of domain alternatives. Let me first briefly summarize their account. In line with 
the approach in Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) on which they build, Alonso-Ovalle 
and Menéndez-Benito derive the inferences triggered by epistemic indefinites as 
conversational implicatures arising via Gricean reasoning. The difference between 
total and partial variation is shown to stem from different constraints on the domain of 
quantification associated with the epistemic indefinite: whereas total variation 
indefinites like irgendein act as domain wideners, partial variation indefinites like 
algún impose an anti-singleton constraint on their domain (i.e. they signal that their 
domain is not a singleton). The quantificational domain determines the alternative 
assertions that would have resulted from the consideration of a different domain. They 
are obtained by considering either all subsets of the maximal domain of quantification 
(irgendein) or singleton sets only (algún). Standard Gricean reasoning over these 
alternatives leads to the modal inferences described above.  
Let us see how Chierchia generalizes this insight and integrates it in the 
alternatives-and-exhaustification framework.33,34 On his approach, epistemic 
indefinites, like all other elements in the polarity system, have active alternatives (as 
part of their lexical semantics). The total/partial variation distinction stems from 
different lexically activated subdomain alternatives: if the domain alternatives are 
‘large’, i.e. they include any possible subset of D, the resulting meaning is a total 
variation, free choice interpretation - there is a single individual satisfying the 
existential claim and all relevant alternatives qualify as possible options; if the 
domain alternatives to which exhaustification applies are ‘small’ (singletons), the 
resulting meaning is partial variation - some, but not necessarily all, alternatives 
qualify as options. The choice between these two kinds of alternatives is a lexical 
property of the epistemic indefinite. The observed modal inferences arise from regular 
(recursive) exhaustification over the sets of active alternatives.    
The derivation of the meaning of irgendein in modal contexts (section 3.2) has 
already illustrated how the computation of ‘large’ domain alternatives leads to free 
choice effects in Chierchia’s theory. In order to show how the posited difference in 
domain alternatives affects the extent of variation associated with the epistemic 
indefinite, I will use examples with Romanian indefinites and contrast the 
                                                
33 See Fălăuş (2009) for a first attempt to integrate Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito’s hypothesis 
in the alternatives-and-exhaustification framework, in order to capture the difference between vreun 
and un oarecare. 
34 A detailed comparison with Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito’s work lies beyond the scope of 
this paper. Let me just point out that the two accounts are couched in different alternative-based 
frameworks, and refer the reader to Chierchia (2013a,b) and Fălăuş (2013) for remarks on the 
similarities and differences between the present approach and the Hamblin style semantics in Kratzer 
and Shimoyama (2002).  
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interpretation of vreun (a partial variation indefinite) and un NP oarecare (total 
variation) in the scope of a possibility modal: 
 
(64) a. Maria poate să      se      căsătorească cu     un doctor oarecare.  
      Maria may   SUBJ REFL  marry            with a    doctor OARECARE 
    ‘Maria may marry a doctor, any doctor.’ 
 b. Se     poate ca   Maria să      se      căsătorească cu     vreun   doctor. 
     REFL may   that Maria SUBJ  REFL  marry           with  VREUN  doctor 
      ‘Maria might marry some doctor or other.’ 
 
Setting aside for now the fact that the possibility modal has a deontic construal in 
(64a) and an epistemic one in (64b),35 let us consider the two sentences under the 
following LF representation: 
 
(65) a. ◊ [a doctori  [Maria marries ti ]]             
b. Assertion: ◊ ∃x ∈ D [one(x) ∧ doctor(x) ∧ marry(Maria,x)] 
 
The assertion is identical to what we would have with a simple indefinite. However, 
unlike ordinary indefinites, both un oarecare and vreun activate two kinds of 
alternatives, scalar and domain, requiring exhaustification. As far as scalar 
alternatives are concerned, the two indefinites behave identically - they activate the 
alternatives in (66a): 
 
(66) a. SA = {◊ ∃x ∈ D [n(x) ∧ doctor(x) ∧ marry(Maria,x)] | n ∈ N} 
 b. Exhaustification over scalar alternatives 
     OSA ◊ (a∨b∨c) = ◊ (a∨b∨c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧b) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (b∧c) 
 
Assuming a domain with only three individuals, we exhaustify over scalar alternatives 
and add the scalar implicature to the assertion, thus obtaining (66b), interpreted as 
‘Maria may marry a doctor in {a, b, c}, and it is not possible that she marries two 
doctors’. This meaning component is shared by un NP oarecare and vreun, and more 
generally, by total and partial variation indefinites, and is ultimately responsible for 
their existential interpretation. Nothing new thus far.  
More interesting is the computation of domain alternatives, which constitutes 
the source of the total vs. partial variation distinction. More precisely, Chierchia 
assumes that (i) the activation of all subdomain alternatives leads to total variation 
(sustained by un NP oarecare) and (ii) the activation of singleton domain alternatives 
is responsible for partial variation (which we see in the case of vreun). The domain 
alternatives for un oarecare are schematized in (67): 
 
                                                
35 To provide a real minimal pair, we would have to use un oarecare in an epistemic context. However, 
most speakers find un oarecare degraded or entirely deviant with epistemic modal auxiliaries. For 
details on the distribution and interpretation of un oarecare in modal contexts, see Fălăuş (to appear).  
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(67) a.          ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c)       ASSERTION 
     ◊ (a ∨ b)      ◊ (b ∨ c)        ◊ (a ∨ c)    DA 
         ◊ a    ◊ b      ◊ c       
 b.  ◊ (a∨b) ∧ ¬ ◊ c        ◊ (b∨c) ∧ ¬ ◊ a          ◊ (a∨c) ∧ ¬ ◊ b         EXH-DA 
                 ◊ a ∧ ¬ ◊ b ∧ ¬ c     ◊ b ∧ ¬ ◊ a ∧ ¬ ◊ c   ◊ c ∧ ¬ ◊ a ∧ ¬ ◊ b 
 
In (67a), we have the plain domain alternatives activated by un oarecare (familiar 
from the interpretation of irgendein given in section 3.2). They consist of all the 
subsets of the quantificational domain, which in the case at hand means subsets of 
doctors. The sets of alternatives in (67b) are the exhaustified versions of the domain 
alternatives activated by the indefinite, which are obtained by attaching O in front of 
each of the domain alternatives in (67a). For example, ‘◊(a∨b)∧¬◊c’ stands for ‘Maria 
may only marry doctor a or b’, i.e. she may not marry doctor c, and ‘◊a∧¬◊b∧¬◊c’ 
stands for ‘Maria may only marry doctor a’, i.e. she may not marry doctor b or doctor 
c. Similarly for all other alternatives.  
 In contrast to this, the set of domain alternatives activated by partial variation 
indefinites such as vreun is smaller - it only includes (pre-exhaustified) singleton 
domain alternatives. In other words, for vreun, we only consider domain alternatives 
of the kind ‘Maria may only marry doctor a (and not b or c)’, as represented in (68): 
 
(68) a.          ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c)       ASSERTION 
                  ◊ a           ◊ b      ◊ c      DA 
 b. ◊ a ∧ ¬ ◊ b ∧ ¬ ◊ c   ◊ b ∧ ¬ ◊ a ∧ ¬ ◊ c   ◊ c ∧ ¬ ◊ a ∧ ¬ ◊ b    EXH-DA 
     
Working things out, we compute the enriched meaning of the sentences in (64), by 
putting together the assertion with the negation of all the exhaustified alternatives, 
which yields the following meaning: 
 
(69) a. Exhaustification over the alternatives activated by un oarecare  
    OEXH-DA◊(a ∨ b ∨ c) = ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧b) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (b∧c) ∧ 
       ◊a ∧ ◊b ∧ ◊c                 ð TOTAL VARIATION 
b. Exhaustification over the alternatives activated by vreun 
     OEXH-DA◊(a ∨ b ∨ c) = ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧b) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (b∧c) ∧ 
   (◊a ∧ ◊b) ∨ (◊a ∧ ◊c) ∨ (◊b ∧ ◊c) ð PARTIAL VARIATION 
 
We are already familiar with the enriched meaning obtained by exhaustification over 
domain alternatives of any size, given in (69a), which results in a typical free choice 
interpretation, requiring that each alternative of a, b and c be a possibility - a total 
variation effect. This, together with the assertion enriched by the scalar implicature, 
yields the standard reading of total variation indefinites like un NP oarecare: Maria 
can marry some doctor in the relevant domain ({a,b,c}) and any doctor is a possible 
option. In contrast to this, the meaning induced by singleton domain alternatives 
requires that if some alternative is true, at least some other must be (69b). To put it 
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differently, at least two of the alternatives are true in some world, but not necessarily 
all of them (partial variation). 
This demonstrates how Chierchia is able to exploit a small difference in the 
choice of alternatives to derive different interpretive effects. Just like polarity 
elements vary as to whether they allow pre-exhaustified domain alternatives, a lexical 
property, the activation of all domain alternatives vs. singletons distinguishes total 
and partial variation indefinites. This captures the different inferences triggered by 
vreun and the closely related existential un NP oarecare. The restriction to singleton 
domain alternatives has no impact in downward-entailing contexts, where the 
assertion always entails the alternatives (regardless of whether they are restricted to 
minimal subdomains). But it proves crucial in deriving the weaker modal inference 
triggered by vreun (and other partial variation indefinites) in modal contexts. Once we 
adopt Chierchia’s theory, we have a uniform analysis of vreun in NPI and modal 
contexts, which also captures some of the differences with other indefinites, e.g. the 
closely related item un oarecare. However, the account does not yet explain the 
restriction to epistemic contexts, which sets vreun apart from the epistemic indefinites 
documented to date. This is the challenge I undertake in the next section. 
4.3 Deriving the epistemic constraint  
In section 2 above, we examined the occurrences of vreun in non-negative polarity 
contexts and argued that the lexical semantics of the relevant operators necessarily 
includes an ‘uncertainty’ component, an intuition that I subsumed under the epistemic 
constraint in (17). This generalization was shown to bring together epistemic modals 
(closely related to the presumptive mood), epistemic attitude verbs like think, assume 
and hope, while at the same time excluding others, in particular deontic modalities 
and related attitude verbs (e.g. request, suggest, want). The question that we need to 
address is how to derive such a constraint on the theory of polarity adopted here. 
Ideally, we should be able to do it by exploiting the two elements responsible for 
variation elsewhere in the polarity system: alternatives and modes of exhaustification. 
In other words, vreun should activate scalar and singleton domain alternatives, like it 
always does; exhaustification over these alternatives will be consistent in epistemic 
contexts, but will clash with the lexical semantics of deontics and other intensional 
operators that don’t fall under the epistemic constraint. The question then becomes 
what kind of condition on alternatives or exhaustification can generate this behavior. 
In the following, I submit the hypothesis that the restriction to epistemic contexts 
results from a further condition on the domain alternatives associated with vreun.  
 Let me first give an informal overview of the account (first proposed in Fălăuş 
2010). As we will see shortly, in languages that have both total and partial variation 
epistemic indefinites, the use of a partial variation epistemic indefinite can optionally 
give rise to an ‘anti-total variation’ implicature. Capitalizing on this observation, I 
argue that this implicature is built into the meaning of vreun, i.e. it has been 
lexicalized. This hypothesis will be implemented by assuming that vreun includes 
among its active alternatives the total variation indefinite un oarecare (which comes 
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with its own alternatives). A second building block of my proposal relates to the 
independently observable fact that certain modal operators, when taking existentials 
in their scope, trigger free choice, total variation effects. The lexical meaning of vreun 
is going to clash with the semantics of these inherently free choice modals. On the 
proposed account, the more restricted distribution of vreun will therefore once again 
be derivable from the interaction between its lexical semantics and the semantic 
properties of the embedding operator.  
4.3.1 The ban on total variation 
Let us start by focusing on the conjectured ban on total variation. We have seen that 
vreun behaves on a par with algún or un qualche and sustains partial variation, being 
compatible with situations where not all individuals in the domain of quantification 
constitute possible values for the existential claim (as in the hide-and-seek scenario in 
(63) above). Pursuing this line of thinking, I argue that vreun differs from other partial 
variation indefinites by imposing a stronger constraint, i.e. not only does vreun allow 
partial variation, but actually requires it. In other words, for vreun to be appropriate, 
we must rule out the option of total variation, which would allow any member of the 
domain to be a possible alternative. Let me now show what motivates this proposal. 
 As we know, partial variation epistemic indefinites like un qualche or algún 
convey a weaker modal inference than total variation elements. Interestingly, the use 
of a partial variation indefinite can give rise to an optional ‘anti-total variation’ 
implicature, as illustrated by the following example (due to Chierchia 2013a, p. 286): 
  
(70) Voglio sposare un qualche linguista  
        ‘I want to marry some linguist or other,  
 a. … ma non un linguista qualsiasi. Non sposerei mai un semanticista. 
          but not any old linguist. I would never marry a semanticist.’ 
 b. … uno qualsiasi. 
               a      QUALSIASI 
             ‘I want to marry some linguist; anyone will do.’ 
 
The sentence in (70) can trigger the implicature in (70a), and convey that the speaker 
would not be happy with any linguist in the relevant quantificational domain, e.g. not 
a semanticist. But this meaning effect is clearly removable, as (70b) shows.  
 The difference, I claim, between un qualche (and other partial variation 
epistemic indefinites) and vreun is that the latter ‘grammaticizes’ this anti-total 
variation inference. In other words, vreun is incompatible with total variation 
scenarios. If, for example, all rooms were known to be possible options in the hide-
and-seek scenario in (63), vreun would be deviant. The following scenario, which is 
parallel to the card game in (28), further illustrates the ban on total variation: 
 
(71) The ‘shell game’ requires three shells or boxes and a small ball. The ball is 
placed under one of the boxes and the operator quickly shuffles the boxes 
around. In order to win, the player has to identify the box containing the ball. 
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 #Mingea trebuie să     fie        în vreo     cutie. 
   ball-the must      SUBJ be.3SG  in VREUN  box 
  ‘The ball must be in some box or other.’  
 
The context in (71) makes it clear that the ball could be in any of the three boxes 
under consideration, although the speaker does not know which box is the right one. 
However, despite the ignorance concerning the box satisfying the modal claim, vreun 
cannot be used. The reason, I submit, is the incompatibility with total variation, which 
I take to be a restriction built into the semantics of vreun. Insofar as I can tell, no such 
restriction is associated with other partial variation items: they are not used to convey 
total variation, but are perfectly compatible with such set-ups.36  
 Let me first show how such an effect could be obtained compositionally within 
our general framework and then discuss its consequences for the distribution of vreun. 
We are trying to build into the meaning of vreun an anti-total variation inference. We 
know that the total variation inference in Romanian is normally triggered by un 
oarecare (cf. (64) above). The Italian examples in (70) suggest that partial and total 
variation indefinites form a scale, where the lower element on the scale can trigger the 
inference that the stronger alternative does not hold. If vreun and un oarecare are 
scale-mates, an arguably plausible way to implement this additional condition is to 
assume that vreun lexicalizes a (strong) form of competition with the total variation 
indefinite un NP oarecare.37 More specifically, I conjecture that the set of formal 
alternatives activated by vreun includes un oarecare. Since un oarecare is itself an 
alternative-bearing element, this implies that vreun takes among its alternatives both 
the total variation indefinite un oarecare and the alternatives activated by un 
oarecare. The full set of alternatives activated by vreun thus includes not only the 
usual scalar and singleton domain alternatives (72b-c), but also the ‘complex’ 
alternatives brought about by the competition with un oarecare (72d): 
 
(72) a. ⟦vreun⟧ = λPλQ ∃x ∈ D [one(x) ∧ P(x) ∧ Q(x)]  
b. SA = {λPλQ ∃x ∈ D [n(x) ∧ P(x) ∧ Q(x)] | n ∈ N}  
c. DA = {λPλQ ∃x ∈ {a}[one(x) ∧ P(x) ∧ Q(x)] | a ∈ D} 
d. {<⟦un oarecare⟧, ⟦un oarecare⟧ALT>}38 
 
The anti-total variation effect is going to result from exhaustification over singleton 
domain alternatives (which preserves the usual partial variation effect) and over the 
                                                
36 For example, my Spanish informants accept the use of algún in this context, both on its partitive and 
non-partitive version. Partitive vreun is also acceptable (see the discussion in section 2.5). 
37 To make this point more convincingly, one would also need to provide a detailed discussion of the 
properties of un oarecare, something which cannot be done here. For evidence that vreun and un 
oarecare have complementary distributions and interpretations, see Fălăuş (to appear).  
38 Once we allow for complex alternatives of this kind, the notion of functional application for 
alternatives will have to be suitably generalized, as usually assumed for focus alternatives, cf. e.g. 
Rooth (1985), Krifka (2006): 
(i) (Recursive) Pointwise Functional application  
     If ⟦ (α β) ⟧  = f(⟦α⟧, ⟦β⟧), then ⟦ (α β) ⟧ALT = {f(X, Y) | X ∈ ⟦α⟧ALT, Y ∈ ⟦β⟧ALT} 
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complex alternatives in (72d) (,which leads to the ban on total variation). One 
question that might arise concerns the order in which these alternatives are 
considered. In the following, I assume that we first compute complex alternatives <φ, 
φALT>, which results in the usual total variation inference (along the lines of (67) and 
(69) above). The result is added to the set of domain alternatives and exhaustification 
then proceeds in the usual manner. For illustration, consider the following sentence 
with vreun under a possibility modal: 
 
(73) Poate   Maria s-a          întâlnit cu    vreun   prieten.  
 maybe  Maria REFL-has met      with VREUN friend 
 ‘Maybe Maria met some friend.’ 
 
Exhaustification with respect to scalar alternatives works as before (see (66)), so let us 
concentrate on the alternatives responsible for the anti-total variation inference. The 
novelty with respect to previous examples lies in the consideration of complex 
alternatives (72d). Simply put, the computation of these alternatives yields the 
meaning effect we would obtain if un oarecare were used in (73); in a domain with 
three elements, this winds up in the standard total variation inference, derived as in 
(69) above, repeated in (74):  
 
(74) OEXH-DA◊(a ∨ b ∨ c) = ◊(a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ ¬O ◊ (a∨b) ∧ ¬O ◊ (a∨c) ∧ ¬O ◊ (b∨c) ∧    
¬O ◊ a ∧ ¬O ◊ b ∧ ¬O ◊ c 
                        = ◊a ∧ ◊b ∧ ◊c                
 
In prose, this amounts to the statement that Maria could be with any of the three 
individuals in the domain. Now, adding this to the set of formal alternatives we are 
assuming for vreun, the full set of alternatives for the sentence in (73) to which 
exhaustification is going to apply is the one in (75): it includes the assertion (like it 
always does), the set of exhaustified singleton domain alternatives (familiar from 
previous examples, see (68)) and the alternatives corresponding to the complex 
alternative associated with un oarecare:  
 
(75) ⟦(73)⟧ALT = {  ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c),   Assertion 
O◊a, O◊b, O◊c,   Exhaustified singleton domains 
 OEXH-DA ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c)  Total Variation un oarecare (74) 
   ◊ (a∧b), ◊ (a∧c), ◊ (b∧c)    } Scalar alternatives 
 
Exhaustification with respect to the set of alternatives in (75) yields the following 
anti-total variation inference: 
 
(76) a. OALT(◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c)) = ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧                      (Assertion) 
  ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧b) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧c) ∧ ¬ ◊(b∧c)            (Scalar alternatives) 
            ∧ (◊a → (◊b∨◊c)) ∧ (◊b → (◊a∨◊c)) ∧ (◊c → (◊a∨◊b))      (Singleton domains) 
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       ∧ ¬ (◊ a ∧ ◊ b ∧ ◊ c )               (un oarecare) 
  b.   = (◊a ∧ ◊b) ∨ (◊a ∧ ◊c) ∨ (◊b ∧ ◊c)                   (= PARTIAL VARIATION) 
            ∧ ¬(◊a ∧ ◊b ∧ ◊c )                                    (= ANTI-TOTAL VARIATION) 
 
The meaning we get for a model with three alternatives is that at least two alternatives 
are true in some world, but no more than two are (they cannot all be true). The 
formula in (76) entails that one of the alternatives is false, although we don’t know 
which one. For this to hold, more than one alternative has to be possible, thus 
excluding models where there is no variation (M1). In addition, vreun rules out total 
variation models (M2) and requires that at least one of the alternatives fail to be true. 
So (76) is only satisfied in partial variation models like M3 and M4 below. 
 
(77)  a. Falsifying models for vreun    b. Verifying models for vreun 
     M1      M2            M3     M4      
    w1    a  w1      a    w1     a          w1     b  
    w2    a  w2      b w2     a          w2     c 
       w3    a  w3      c   w3     b          w3     c 
  
This provides the first building block of our account of the epistemic constraint: the 
meaning of vreun encodes an anti-total variation requirement. This can be obtained on 
the assumption that vreun activates a richer set of alternatives, which includes its 
scalemate, the total variation indefinite un oarecare. To see how the anti-total 
variation condition derives the exclusion of vreun from deontic (and related non-
epistemic) contexts, we now turn to the second ingredient of my analysis, which 
concerns the meaning of the modal operators interacting with vreun.  
4.3.2 Modals and free choice inferences 
In line with the alternative-based approach pursued here, we expect the narrower 
distribution of vreun in modal contexts, i.e. its exclusion from non-epistemic contexts, 
to fall out of the interaction between its active alternatives and the lexical semantics of 
the modal operators in the local structure. The remaining question is how to obtain the 
desired difference between epistemic and deontic (bouletic, and more generally 
priority modals) to which vreun seems to be sensitive. In the following, I argue that 
non-epistemic modals have, in a sense to be explained shortly, a strong free choice 
potential. To make this hypothesis more precise, we will proceed in two steps. First, 
we adopt the semantics of modalities in Aloni (2007) and derive the fact that vreun is 
ruled out in imperatives (a fact already illustrated in example (11)). Next, we extend 
this account to modal auxiliaries and consider various empirical facts to substantiate 
the claim that deontics, but not epistemics, have a strong free choice character. 
Building on the observed differences between the two kinds of modals, I derive the 
restriction of vreun to epistemic contexts from a clash between the conjectured anti-
total variation requirement and the free choice semantics of deontic modals.  
We begin by presenting the analysis in Aloni (2007), focusing on the two 
aspects that are directly relevant for the present account. First, disjunctions and 
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indefinites are assumed to have two different representations: a regular and an 
alternative-inducing one, as given in (78a-b): 
 
 (78) a. Non-alternative-inducing representation:  
∃xA(x)    ALT = {∃xA(x)} 
  b. Alternative-inducing representation  
   ∃p(p ∧ ∃x(p=A(x)))   ALT = {A(d1), …, A(dn)} 
 
Truth-conditionally, the two representations are equivalent (and amount to existential 
quantification), but only the latter introduces genuine sets of alternatives (closely 
related to our domain alternatives). Dependent indefinites, like irgendein or vreun, 
always use alternative-inducing representations, i.e. their interpretation always 
associates with a set of alternatives.   
A second key assumption is that modals and imperatives are alternative-
sensitive operators (in the spirit of e.g. Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, Menéndez-
Benito 2005), a property that renders them analogous to the exhaustification operators 
employed by the present framework. More concretely, modals operate over 
(propositional) alternatives generated in their scope and entail that all alternatives 
should be compatible with the relevant modal base, i.e. each member of the 
alternative set should be possible, as in (79):39 
 
(79) a. ◊φ is true iff every alternative induced by φ is compatible with the modal 
base 
 b. ¨φ is true iff every alternative induced by φ is compatible with the modal 
base and at least one alternative induced by φ is entailed by the modal base 
 
If the modal operator applies to the alternative-activating representation of an 
existential (78b), it gives rise to free choice effects, whereby each member of the 
alternative set is possible (80a). If on the other hand, it applies to the regular 
representation in (78a), no free choice effects are generated. This latter option yields 
the reading in (80b), which can be brought out by adding ‘…but I don’t know which’:  
 
(80) You may have ice cream or cake. 
 a. ◊ have ice cream ∧ ◊ have cake   
 b. ◊ (have ice cream ∨ have cake)   
 
Let us now see how this proposal can help capture the behavior of alternative-
activating indefinites in imperatives: 
 
                                                
39 The analysis in Aloni (2007) does not extend to necessity modals, for reasons pertaining to the 
distribution of any (see also fn. 24). However, as mentioned in Aloni and Franke (2013), the properties 
of any are derived differently in Chierchia (2013a), and consequently, once we allow for modals to 
operate over alternatives, nothing prevents the definition of an alternative-sensitive necessity modal.        
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(81)  Ia        *vreo      carte / ✓o carte oarecare! 
take.IMP.2SG    VREUN   card      a  card  OARECARE 
‘Take a card!’ 
 
On Aloni’s account, imperatives have a semantics close to necessity modals, with a 
free choice component built into their meaning, as in (82):  
 
(82) Imperative !φ is true in w iff  
(i) every alternative induced by φ is compatible with the modal base  
(ii) the union of all these alternatives is entailed by the modal base 
 
Applying this analysis to imperatives with alternative-activating indefinites such as 
those in (81) and assuming a domain with three elements, this amounts to the 
interpretation in (83): 
 
(83) ¨ [pick card1 ∨ pick card2 ∨ pick card3] ∧ ◊ pick card1 ∧ ◊ pick card2 ∧ ◊ pick 
card3 
 
In other words, in each of the worlds compatible with the speaker’s desires (goals, 
etc.), one of the three cards in the relevant domain gets picked. According to clause (i) 
above, each card is a possible way to comply with the request (order, suggestion, etc.) 
expressed by the imperative. The resulting free choice effect is compatible with a total 
variation indefinite like un oarecare, but clashes with the meaning of vreun proposed 
in section 4.3.1. More precisely, with the anti-total variation constraint built into the 
semantics of vreun, represented in (84): 
 
(84) a. Anti-Total Variation with possibility modals 
    (◊a ∧ ◊b) ∨ (◊a ∧ ◊c) ∨ (◊b ∧ ◊c) ∧ ¬(◊a ∧ ◊b ∧ ◊c ) 
 b. Anti-Total Variation with necessity modals 
  ¨(a ∨ b) ∨ ¨(b ∨ c) ∨  ¨(a ∨ c) ∧ ¬¨a ∧ ¬¨b ∧ ¬¨c 
 
We have already shown how anti-total variation is derived under possibility modals, 
in (76) above. The formula in (84b) spells out the ban on total variation with necessity 
modals (which I must leave to the reader to compute):40 at least two alternatives must 
be true, but no single one is necessarily true. These formulae are only satisfied in 
models where one of the alternatives fails to hold, such as M3 or M4 in (85), repeated 
from above:  
 
(85)  a. Falsifying models for vreun    b. Verifying models for vreun 
     M1      M2            M3     M4      
    w1    a  w1      a    w1     a          w1     b  
    w2    a  w2      b w2     a          w2     c 
       w3    a  w3      c   w3     b          w3     c 
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On this proposal, the deviance of vreun in (81) results from two conflicting 
requirements: the interpretation of the imperative, given in (83), only satisfied in a 
total variation model (M2), and the meaning of vreun, which is incompatible with 
total variation. The only modification introduced in the system is that we allow 
modals to operate directly over alternatives, a move that is compatible with the 
present framework (see Chierchia 2013a, p. 359 for further discussion). Although we 
cannot properly address the details of Aloni’s proposal, the predictions of this line of 
analysis should be clear: free choice effects are the result of the interplay between (i) 
an existential element with an alternative-triggering representation (78b) and (ii) a 
modal alternative-sensitive operator (with the semantics in (79) or (82)). If one of the 
two ingredients is missing, no free choice interpretation arises.41  
The analysis just sketched gets us one step closer to deriving the restriction of 
vreun to epistemic contexts. More specifically, extending this approach, I submit that 
deontic (and other priority) modals, but not epistemics, behave like imperatives, i.e. 
they induce a free choice, total variation reading of alternative-activating existentials 
in their scope. Just like with imperatives then, this property clashes with the 
conjectured ‘anti-total variation’ meaning of vreun. I will make a case that such a 
distinction among modals is, on the one hand, plausible in view of how they affect 
alternatives in their scope and, on the other hand, independently needed to capture 
other phenomena that seem sensitive to this split. If the proposal is on the right track, 
we explain the epistemic constraint to which vreun is subject.  
There are a number of empirical observations supporting the claim that certain 
modals have a stronger free choice character. In the following, we will concentrate on 
the contrast between deontic and epistemic modals, but similar considerations 
arguably apply to other non-epistemic modalities and attitude predicates (for 
bouletics, see Chierchia 2013a, pp. 264-267). Both deontic and epistemic modals can 
trigger free choice effects on disjunction (and existentials) in their scope. In uttering 
something like You may eat the cake or the ice cream (with unstressed or), we 
typically convey that both eating the cake and eating the ice cream are allowable 
options. This is precisely the reason why a sequence like You may eat the cake or the 
ice cream; in fact you may only eat the cake is perceived as contradictory. If 
permission holds for the initial set of options (which includes the cake and the ice 
                                                                                                                                       
40 For a full derivation of anti-total variation under necessity modals, see Chierchia (2013a, p. 299). 
41 This leaves open the possibility that if, for some reason, the modal/imperative operator does not have 
the free choice-inducing semantics in (79)/(82), vreun becomes acceptable. This prediction is borne 
out. Fălăuş (2012) shows that vreun is acceptable in (roughly) those imperatives where English would 
use some, e.g. Talk to some neighbor (they might be able to help)! I can see two ways to accommodate 
this observation. The first is to follow Aloni and argue that these imperatives do not induce total 
variation (they are so-called ‘alternative-presenting’ imperatives), i.e. they have a way of satisfying the 
anti-total variation constraint (as suggested in Fălăuş 2012). Another option is to maintain the 
semantics in (82) for imperatives, but assume that there is a second modal present in their structure, 
which weakens the free choice semantics of the imperative. This second strategy is in line with recent 
analyses of imperatives (e.g. Kaufmann 2012) and is independently argued for in Dayal (2013), which 
shows the need for a more fine-grained understanding of the interaction between imperatives and free 
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cream), then it must also hold for each of its subsets, i.e. each of the disjuncts. 
Likewise with epistemic modals, e.g. John might be in Paris or in Barcelona can give 
rise to the inference that he might be in any of the two cities. However, upon closer 
scrutiny, there are interesting differences between these two kinds of modalities, 
which suggest that free choice inferences are more readily available in deontic 
contexts. To see this, let us consider the interaction between modals and indefinites. 
One supporting empirical observation comes from their behavior with respect 
to implicit exceptions, which are perfectly compatible with epistemics, but not with 
deontics. Consider (86):   
 
(86) a. John must/may go to one of the rooms upstairs. 
 b. John must/might be in one of the rooms upstairs. 
 
The sentence in (86a), with a deontic modal, either conveys that John must/may go to 
a specific room, or if not, his obligation/permission is satisfied by going to any one of 
the rooms in the context. Unless specified otherwise, any room in the relevant domain 
should be a way of complying. If it turns out that John went to, say, my bedroom, it 
would be odd to complain by uttering something like Oh wait, I didn’t mean this 
room. Any exception should be explicitly ruled out.42 The epistemic statement in 
(86b) is compatible with a wider variety of situations. Just like with the deontic, the 
modal claim could be about a specific room, or could apply to any room. Crucially 
however, it could also apply to any subset of the relevant rooms, like in the hide-and-
seek scenario we used in (63), where not all rooms are possible options. Nothing 
forces the free choice inference, unlike what we observe with the deontic modal.43  
A similar point can be made by considering cases where we clearly restrict the 
freedom of choice, i.e. we exclude one of the possible alternatives. Once again, a 
different pattern emerges in deontic and epistemic cases: whereas epistemics are 
compatible with such set-ups, deontics are not. For example, suppose we are playing a 
game consisting of negotiating moves with an oracle that answers queries and gives 
instructions. If the oracle knows that the treasure is in Room A, and therefore Room B 
is not a real option, it could still felicitously utter (87a). In contrast to this, the oracle 
                                                                                                                                       
choice elements like any. A proper discussion of this complex issue would take us too far afield from 
the main purposes of this paper. 
42 As suggested by an anonymous referee, the free choice induced on existentials under deontic modals 
may have to do with their function to restrict, or in the case of possibility operators, to un-restrict 
options. If a possible value is not explicitly excluded, the deontic operator rules it in. 
43 Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2013) dispute the claim that deontic modals trigger free 
choice on the basis of examples like the following, where they take exceptives to indicate that the 
indefinite phrase does not refer to the entire set of cards (i.e. we have a partial variation context):  
     (i) You can take a card, except for this one/but it can’t be any of the aces. 
Note however that exceptives are compatible with both partial variation (e.g. algún or vreun in (63)) 
and total variation determiners. For example, they are compatible with universals or free choice 
indefinites Take every/any card, except this one (see von Fintel 1993) and with total variation 
indefinites like un oarecare/un qualsiasi (Chierchia 2013a, p. 268). As a result, exceptives do not 
provide a reliable test for the strength of free choice inferences.  
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could not say (87b) knowing that Room B is not an option, because, say, it is locked 
(it would have to say ‘you may try to go into Room A or Room B’): 
 
(87) a. The treasure might be in Room A or in Room B. 
 b. You may go into Room A or Room B.  
 
I take these facts as indicating that deontic modals with alternative-activating 
elements in their scope have a stronger free choice flavor, i.e. they give rise to a total 
variation inference. The wider range of interpretations observed with epistemic 
operators shows that they do not impose such a requirement, although they are of 
course compatible with total variation set-ups.  
 Further evidence in favor of the claim that deontics and epistemics can trigger 
different effects on embedded alternatives comes from so-called universal free choice 
inferences, recently discussed in Aloni and Franke (2013). It has been observed that 
free choice inferences associated with disjunction under deontic modals take scope 
under universal quantifiers (Chemla 2009). For example, the sentence in (88a) 
supports the free choice inference in (88b): 
 
(88)  a. Every student may take semantics or pragmatics. 
b. Every student may take semantics and every student may take pragmatics. 
 
Crucially, this effect seems to depend on the kind of modality involved. Van Tiel 
(2011) provides experimental evidence suggesting that the inference in (88) is 
significantly stronger than the one in (89), with an epistemic modal:44 
 
(89) a. According to the professor, every research question might be answered by a 
survey or an experiment. 
b. According to the professor, every research question might be answered by a 
survey, and, according to the professor, every research question might be 
answered by an experiment. 
  
Universal free choice inferences are possible with epistemic modals, but they are less 
prominent than with deontic modals. This once again suggests that deontics and 
epistemics induce different effects on alternatives in their scope. 
 The data considered here lead to the conclusion that alternative-activating 
elements can acquire different interpretations in epistemic and deontic contexts, 
corroborating the observation made for vreun. Furthermore, the sensitivity of vreun to 
different types of modality fits in with other recent studies showing similar 
differences in other domains. For example, Aloni and Port (2010) observe that 
irgendein gives rise to different inferences under the two kinds of modals: total 
variation in deontic contexts and partial variation in epistemic ones (see also Lauer 
                                                
44 The use of ‘according to the professor’ is meant to facilitate the epistemic reading of the modal, 
which is otherwise not very prominent.  
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(2010)). This suggests a strong correlation between deontic modals and total 
variation. Moreover, Crnič (2011) shows that concessive scalar particles like 
Slovenian magari are licensed under deontic modals but not under epistemic ones. 
Interestingly, both studies provide explanations that rely on free choice inferences 
being different in deontic and epistemic contexts. To this, we may add the behavior of 
supplementary any (e.g. Dayal 2004): while with epistemic necessity modals 
supplementary any is infelicitous, with deontics not only is it felicitous, but seems 
emphatic or even redundant.  
 
(90)  a. # John must be with a friend, any friend. 
 b. John must come with a friend, any friend. 
 
These facts provide converging evidence that deontics and epistemics have a different 
impact on alternative-activating elements. The differences, manifested in various 
constructions, should follow from the semantics of the modal operators, as we have 
tried to indicate here. The precise implementation of the distinction in free choice 
potential is at this point an open issue. The strategy pursued here consists in building 
this property into the meaning of deontic operators, along the lines of Aloni (2007).45 
In a recent study, which to my knowledge is the only formally explicit attempt to 
tackle this problem, Aloni and Franke (2013) explore a pragmatic account. The gist of 
their proposal is that the observed differences can be explained in terms of pragmatic 
relevance. More precisely, they contrast situations in which deontic and epistemic 
universal free choice inferences (e.g. (88)-(89)) do or do not arise. They argue that 
such inferences are more relevant for practical purposes, i.e. for choosing a course of 
action, in deontic than in epistemic contexts.46 As a result, free choice effects are 
                                                
45 There are several other possible ways to formally capture the free choice character of deontics on a 
semantic account. A weaker version of the idea sketched in the text is to maintain a standard (non-
alternative-sensitive) meaning for modals and assume that the free choice component is a 
presupposition of deontic modals, as spelled out in (i): 
(i) ¨DEONTIC (φ) is defined iff for every p ∈ ALT(φ), ◊DEONTIC p 
This has the effect of requiring that each alternative be true in some world of the modal base. If there 
are no active alternatives, this has no effect. But in the presence of an alternative-triggering element, 
this induces free choice effects. The anti-total variation meaning of vreun clashes with the free choice 
presupposition in (i), hence its deviance in deontic contexts. 
 Chierchia (2013a, p. 266) suggests a solution that consists in assuming the following meaning 
postulate (for deontics and imperatives): 
 (ii) ¨
FC [∃x ∈ D [P(x)] → ∀D’ ⊆ D ◊FC ∃x ∈ D’[P(x)]  
To make this work, modals would need to be treated as alternative-sensitive operators. As formulated 
right now, this postulate looks at ‘standard’ meaning, leaving it unclear how it deals with the difference 
between alternative-activating and non-alternative-activating elements. 
  More work is clearly needed to test the predictions of the various conceivable implementations 
and distinguish between these options.  
46 Aloni and Franke relate this difference to the fact that deontic and epistemic statements convey 
different types of information. Intuitively, epistemic information has to do with compatibility between 
pieces of information, without necessarily determining future courses of action. In contrast to this, 
deontic information is factual - it provides directly useful information about practically relevant 
permissions and obligations. This is formalized by adopting a dynamic account of epistemic modality 
(Veltman 1996, Yalcin 2007), combined with a classical relational approach to deontic modality. I refer 
to Aloni and Franke (2013) for further details.  
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more readily and more frequently available with deontic operators. Over time, this 
effect can grammaticalize (via a process called ‘pragmatic fossilization’), leading to 
differences in the extent to which these inferences infiltrate compositional semantics. 
The present paper does not seek to distinguish between a semantic and a 
pragmatic explanation for the different free choice potential of modals. However, I 
would like to address an empirical issue that Aloni and Franke view as problematic 
for a semantic account that combines the proposal in Aloni (2007) and the framework 
in Chierchia (2013a), along the lines being considered here. They argue that once we 
build free choice into the meaning of deontics, we make wrong predictions 
concerning the behavior of partial variation indefinites like un qualche or algún. More 
precisely, if deontics always require free choice among alternatives in their scope, we 
expect all alternative-activating indefinites to give rise to total variation effects in 
deontic contexts. This does not seem to be the case for un qualche in (91), where the 
continuation specifies that not any kind of basic skill is enough:  
 
(91) Per diventare traduttore devi avere un qualche tipo di base. Di sicuro devi     
saper leggere e in alcuni casi devi anche sapere scrivere. 
  ‘To become a translator you must have some basic skills. For sure you must be 
able to read and in some cases you must also know how to write.’ 
 
Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2013) make a similar point concerning (92), 
where algún simply requires that there be at least two doctors that Mary can marry: 
 
(92) Mary se tiene que casar con algún médico.       
‘Mary has to marry some doctor or other.’ 
  
Without getting into a detailed discussion of the properties of un qualche/algún, there 
are two things worth pointing out in this connection. First, the facts are not entirely 
clear at this point. Note that Chierchia (2013a, p. 286) makes the opposite empirical 
claim, arguing that un qualche triggers total variation in examples such as those in 
(93), as confirmed by the infelicity of a continuation that seeks to deny this effect:  
 
(93) a. ?? Prendi una qualche carta, ma non puoi prendere una carta qualsiasi.  
    ‘Take some card or other, but you cannot take any old card.’  
b.?? Per legge, devo avere una qualche assicurazione ma non un’assicurazione 
qualsiasi.  
‘By law, I must have some insurance or other, but not any insurance.’  
 
Moreover, there may be an underlying confounding factor, namely the fact that un 
qualche/algún can be used in deontic contexts where the elements in the 
quantificational domain are (possibly) unknown, hence the impression that the 
speaker does not intend her claim to apply to all elements in the domain. However, 
the possible ignorance concerning elements in the domain is in principle independent 
of total/partial variation. For example, imagine a situation where we are playing hide-
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and-seek in a house I don’t know very well. If I utter (94), my claim applies to all 
rooms in the house (unless specified otherwise). Consequently, I wouldn’t be entitled 
to say that you didn’t follow the rules in case you hid in some secret room of the 
house I wasn’t initially aware of: 
 
(94) Tienes que esconderte en alguna habitación de la casa. 
            ‘You must hide in a room of the house.’ 
 
If it turns out that an element is part of the quantificational domain, this element 
constitutes a viable way of complying with the obligation/permission expressed by the 
modal. Total variation in deontic contexts therefore holds even in the absence of 
knowledge concerning the range of options.  
 A second point I would like to make concerning these facts is that the 
alternative-based approach pursued here has ways to capture the absence of total 
variation of un qualche/algún in deontic contexts (if this turns out to be real). More 
concretely, we could assume that the LF of sentences such as (91)-(92) involves two 
modals, as schematized in (95): the deontic modal auxiliary and a covert assertoric 
(epistemic) modal (discussed in (59) above): 
 
(95) ¨S [un qualche/algún ¨DEONTIC]     
  
In the absence of the null assertoric modal ¨S, this structure is illicit: epistemic 
indefinites always take narrow scope with respect to the modal that ‘licenses’ them 
(for reasons explained in Chierchia 2013a, p. 258). The insertion of a covert modal 
rescues this configuration.47 This ‘last resort’ strategy might then explain the lack of 
total variation perceived in examples such as (91)-(92): the indefinite is not in the 
scope of a deontic operator. (92) simply says that Mary has to marry a doctor and the 
speaker does not know (or care) who that is, without imposing any constraints on 
whether some or all relevant doctors can satisfy the modal claim. A welcome 
consequence of this line of analysis is that the structure in (95) is not available for 
vreun, which we have shown to disallow the covert modality strategy (see the 
discussion in section 4.1). We therefore correctly predict that it can never occur in 
sentences such as (91): the only available LF is one in which vreun is in the scope of 
the deontic modal, which automatically generates a contradiction. If this option is 
available to the alternatives-and-exhaustification approach to deal with the possible 
absence of total variation effects with un qualche/algún, it would have a pay off in 
explaining the different behavior of vreun. 
 The conclusion emerging from our brief discussion of the properties of un 
qualche and algún is that the interaction between modalities and epistemic indefinites 
is a complex matter, still in need of empirical investigation. The crucial point for 
                                                
47 The availability of the covert modality strategy is confirmed by the acceptability of un qualche and 
algún in episodic sentences: 
(i) Maria ha sposato un qualche dentista. 
‘Maria married some dentist or other.’ 
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present purposes is that there is a clear split in the way deontics and epistemics 
interact with alternative-activating elements. Regardless of how exactly this behavior 
is ultimately captured and formalized, I take the free choice character of deontic 
modals to provide a compelling explanation for the restriction of vreun to epistemic 
contexts. My account of the epistemic constraint makes use of two independent 
empirical observations. On the one hand, the anti-total variation inference, optional 
for indefinites like un qualche and algún, but obligatory with vreun (as spelled out in 
4.3.1). On the other hand, the free choice character of deontics, supported by their 
interaction with alternative-activating elements and the differences with epistemic 
modals noted in this connection. If vreun is embedded under a modal that imposes no 
constraints on alternatives, the anti-total variation requirement can be satisfied. Under 
epistemic modals, then, things can go both ways. If nothing in the context imposes 
total variation (as we have seen to be usually the case with epistemics),48 vreun can be 
used. If on the other hand, we have a total variation epistemic set-up, vreun is ruled 
out. This is confirmed by the deviance of vreun in a total variation version of the hide-
and-seek scenario in (63) or in the shell game scenario in (71), which establishes that 
the ball could be in any one of the three boxes under consideration. Deontic modals 
do not have the same flexibility: they trigger free choice on embedded alternatives, 
which systematically clashes with the anti-total variation meaning of vreun. Hence its 
deviance. The only way out would be the insertion of a covert epistemic modal, a 
strategy that vreun disallows. The epistemic constraint thus neatly falls into place. The 
only item-specific property posited here is the anti-total variation requirement, 
triggered by the competition with the total variation indefinite un oarecare. This 
requirement aside, the (un)grammaticality of vreun is a direct consequence of the 
interplay between its alternative-triggering meaning and the semantic properties of the 
embedding operator, just like elsewhere in the polarity system.  
5.  Conclusions 
This paper examined a puzzling case of polarity sensitivity, manifested by Romanian 
vreun, and argued that an alternative-based semantics makes possible a uniform 
account of its distribution. Our study reveals new parameters of variation among 
polarity sensitive indefinites (types of modality) and extends the alternative-and-
exhaustification framework by using a new type of alternatives for meaning 
enrichment (complex alternatives, resulting from competition with other members of 
the polarity system). More concretely, on the empirical side, the main outcome of our 
investigation is the systematic incompatibility between vreun and non-epistemic 
operators, captured by the epistemic constraint. Adopting the alternative-based theory 
developed in Chierchia (2013a), we analyzed vreun as an indefinite with obligatorily 
                                                
48 There is an intuitive connection between the absence of constraints imposed on alternatives in their 
scope and the uncertainty/indirect evidentiality built into the meaning of epistemic operators. Recall 
that the modal base relevant for the interpretation of epistemics contains the worlds not ruled out by 
direct evidence, leaving open a large number of possibilities to satisfy the modal claim. Properly 
justified and worked out, this property of epistemic modals might explain why they allow for a wider 
range of interpretations of alternative-activating elements in their scope.   
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active alternatives, which can only be consistently factored into meaning in the 
presence of a downward-entailing or modal operator. The deviance in non-epistemic 
contexts was argued to arise from two conflicting requirements: the ban on total 
variation encoded by vreun and the free choice component of deontic modals. To 
formally implement this proposal, we hypothesized that vreun activates a richer set of 
alternatives: in addition to scalar and singleton domain alternatives, common to all 
partial variation indefinites, it also includes the ‘complex’ alternatives brought about 
by the competition with un oarecare. This account opens up the possibility that the set 
of active alternatives associated with a polarity sensitive indefinite includes not only 
grammatically determined alternatives (lexically activated or derived via recursive 
exhaustification), but also other alternative-activating elements in the polarity system.    
 I would like to conclude this discussion by briefly mentioning some open 
questions and directions for future research. First, to extend the empirical coverage of 
this account, we need to carefully check its predictions for other intensional contexts. 
This involves a detailed examination of the interaction with other non-epistemic 
modals (e.g. bouletics) and with attitude predicates, whose semantics and embedding 
properties constitute a complex area of investigation in Romanian (e.g. Braşoveanu 
2006, Braşoveanu and Farkas 2007, Anand and Hacquard 2013). The use of vreun in 
certain imperfective contexts (mentioned in section 1.2) indicates that aspectual 
properties may also have a role in satisfying the anti-total variation requirement. A 
further open issue is the role of presuppositions in the (un)acceptability of vreun. Its 
exclusion under factive predicates such as know/find out (noted in (28)) suggests that 
epistemic indefinites may be sensitive not only to truth-conditional aspects of 
meaning (as in all the cases we have considered here), but also presuppositions.49 A 
full account would also make a close comparison between the vreun studied here and 
partitive vreun, since its definite inner noun phrase provides an important control. 
Whatever further empirical properties of vreun will be uncovered, ideally, they should 
follow from the interaction between its lexical meaning and the regular semantics of 
the operators in the context. 
 The properties of vreun discussed in this paper contribute to our knowledge of 
dimensions of variation among semantically dependent indefinites, and as such pave 
the way to a principled explanation for the attested diversity. We have shown how to 
capture this pattern into a tightly regulated parametric system of polarity, preserving 
the insight in Farkas (2002, 2006) that alternatives are the key to understanding the 
behavior of vreun. In explaining its distributional restrictions, we made use of 
independent properties of the operators with which vreun interacts, thus eliminating 
traditional licensing constraints. The outcome is an account where labeling vreun a 
negative polarity item or an epistemic indefinite amounts to nothing more than a 
                                                
49 The proposal that polarity items may be sensitive to different meaning components has been put 
forward in Gajewski (2011) and adopted in Chierchia (2013a) to explain the ungrammaticality of 
strong NPIs in the scope of presuppositional operators such as only. More concretely, weak NPIs like 
ever are argued to be sensitive to just the truth-conditional component of their licensors, while strong 
NPIs like in weeks are sensitive also to the presuppositions and implicatures. It would therefore be 
interesting to find a parallel split among epistemic indefinites. 
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terminological move. The proposal makes clear predictions and offers tools to explore 
other contexts and tackle other potentially relevant factors, like presuppositional 
aspects of meaning or the interaction with temporal and aspectual operators. I leave 
these remaining issues for future research, but I hope to have shown that the present 
approach provides insightful ways to address them.  
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